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OF COPYRIGHT BUREAUCRACIES AND 
INCOHERENCE: STEPPING BACK FROM AUSTRALIA’S 
RECENT COPYRIGHT REFORMS 
KIMBERLEE WEATHERALL* 
[Australian copyright law has recently undergone a period of intense reform. In this article, the 
author seeks to give both a comprehensive history of the period just past, and a bird’s-eye view of the 
resulting reforms — highlighting the hitherto unremarked way in which they affected the many 
institutions which manage copyright. In short, recent copyright reforms have a peculiarly ‘bureau-
cratic’ bent. In many areas, the government created detailed rules capable of objective application 
— rules ideally tailored, perhaps, to the many organisations that participated in the development of 
copyright policy over the period. In addition, the new copyright laws almost across the board reserve 
significant policymaking discretion to the executive: from the Attorney-General to agencies such as 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Australian Communications and 
Media Authority. Whether or not this bureaucratic tendency in copyright marks a shift in focus, or 
simply a continuation of past trends, it certainly warrants closer attention.] 
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[T]here will be a time when it will be much better for us to step back and talk 
about the particular range of often competing interests that we want Australian 
copyright laws to be able to protect or support — not when we are debating just 
a particular set of changes.1 
 
 * BA, LLB (Hons) (Syd), BCL (Oxon), LLM (Yale); Senior Lecturer, T C Beirne School of Law, 
The University of Queensland; Adjunct Research Fellow, Intellectual Property Research Institute 
of Australia (‘IPRIA’); Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. I owe thanks to 
Brad Sherman, Robert Burrell, Chris Creswell, Rebecca Giblin-Chen, David Starkoff, the atten-
dees of a T C Beirne School of Law Research Seminar, and two anonymous referees for helpful 
feedback on the arguments and material in this article. Thanks also to the anonymous and 
not-so-anonymous readers of my erstwhile blog, Weatherall’s Law <http://weatherall.blog 
spot.com>, who kept me honest during the copyright reform process. 
 1 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 December 2006, 65 
(Nicola Roxon, Shadow Attorney-General). 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
There was much sound and fury in Australian copyright policy circles between 
2003 and 2006. The transformation of Australian copyright law in this period has 
been nothing if not rapid. We have had several major events: in particular, the 
conclusion of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement (‘AUSFTA’) in 
2004,2 the passage, first of some 90 pages of amending legislation in 2004, and 
then, in 2006, the 215-page Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth).3 With the 
worst of the storm at least temporarily in abeyance, it is possible to step back and 
offer a holistic view of the outcomes for Australian copyright law. 
Others have already begun the work of summarising and explaining the par-
ticular changes that this period has wrought — copyright term extension, new 
performers’ rights, new exceptions, new anti-circumvention laws and so on. In 
this article, I want to do something different: take a step back and ascertain the 
impact of recent changes on the institutional shape of the copyright system in 
Australia.4  
Institutions matter. Copyright is not only a legal regime for the creation and 
recognition of exclusive, proprietary rights in the fruits of human creativity. It 
also comes with an associated bureaucratic system: a series of institutions and 
agencies which play various roles in managing copyright rights and the relations 
between copyright owners and users. Some of these institutions are entirely 
public in nature: government departments, administrative tribunals, independent 
statutory authorities, and the police and prosecutorial arms of government. 
Others, such as collecting societies, occupy ground between the purely public 
and purely private realms. As I will seek to show, if we step back and look at the 
recent reforms as a whole with this copyright system foremost in our minds, it 
becomes clear that, in numerous large and small ways, the roles of the various 
institutions and entities which make up the copyright system have been changed 
by the recent reforms. To give some examples, the system for enforcement of 
copyright has potentially been transformed by the inclusion of regulatory 
 
 2 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1 (entered into force 1 January 2005). For a 
summary of the contents: see Christopher Arup, ‘The United States–Australia Free Trade Agree-
ment — The Intellectual Property Chapter’ (2004) 15 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 
205. 
 3 In fact, this period comes at the end of a significant decade in copyright law (1996–2006), 
commencing with the negotiation of the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright 
Treaty 1996, opened for signature 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 65 (entered into force 6 March 
2002); the World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
opened for signature 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 76 (entered into force 20 May 2002) 
(‘WPPT’); and (perhaps) concluding with the passage of the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 
(Cth). 
 4 In the interests of full disclosure, my own involvement in the process consisted of commenting 
on developments in an ongoing manner via a web log, Weatherall’s Law <http://weatherall.blog 
spot.com>; making submissions to government reviews; appearing in a personal capacity before 
both the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
(Inquiry into Technological Protection Measures (TPM) Exceptions) (‘TPM Inquiry’) and the 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Inquiry into the Provisions of 
the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth)); serving on the Law Council of Australia IP Sub-
committee; advising the Australian Digital Alliance as a member of its board (from 2005); and 
providing views to Linux Australia in relation to reforms to anti-circumvention laws. I was not 
paid to undertake any of these activities. 
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techniques;5 concerns regarding the effect of the new digital copyright laws on 
public access to works have been addressed by the creation of an administrative 
system for ad hoc resolution of complaints by a government department;6 and in 
a quest for certainty, new exceptions have been written and existing exceptions 
have been restructured in such a way as to make their application practically 
automatic — a style that might suit the bureaucratically organised institutions 
such as libraries or educational institutions which dominated the debate on 
behalf of ‘user’ interests, but may not suit many others.7 I also seek to show that 
these outcomes were not preordained. The government repeatedly selected the 
reform option which most expanded the role of the bureaucracy in the ongoing 
management of copyright. 
The existence of a bureaucratic system for the management of copyright is not 
new, but deserves more attention than it generally receives in Australian aca-
demic circles.8 The relative dearth of such discussion contrasts with a growing 
literature on Australia’s system for examination and grant of registered rights,9 
and on copyright systems in other countries.10 My aim in this article is not only 
to contribute to a greater understanding of recent Australian copyright reforms, 
but also to prompt broader debate about both the nature and effectiveness of 
Australia’s existing copyright system, and how administrative aspects of the 
copyright system should be constructed.  
I I   A BRIEF  HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 2003–06 
Law is shaped by the processes through which it is generated. Before turning 
to the shape and nature of the recent copyright reforms and their impact on the 
copyright system, I will therefore outline the ‘storm’ which gave birth to them. In 
 
 5 See below Part IV(B). 
 6 See below Part IV(C). 
 7 See below Part IV(A). 
 8 The most notable exception is Professor Sam Ricketson: see especially Sam Ricketson, 
‘Intellectual Property Administration and Policy in Australia: An Examination of the Australian 
Situation, Past and Present, and Recommendations for Future Change’ (Paper presented at the 
National Innovation Summit, Melbourne, 9–11 February 2000); Sam Ricketson, ‘The Future of 
Australian Intellectual Property Law and Administration’ (1992) 3 Australian Intellectual Prop-
erty Journal 3. Some attention is given to the operation of the collecting societies, although it is 
intermittent and not academic: see Shane Simpson, Review of Australian Copyright Collecting 
Societies: A Report to the Minister for Communications and the Arts and the Minister for Justice 
(1995); Justice Kevin Lindgren, ‘The Interface between Intellectual Property and AntiTrust: 
Some Current Issues in Australia’ (2005) 16 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 76. Justice 
Lindgren of the Federal Court of Australia is currently the President of the Copyright Tribunal. 
 9 See, eg, Robert Burrell, ‘Trademark Bureaucracies’ in Graeme B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis, 
Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (2007). 
 10 See especially Thomas Streeter, ‘Broadcast Copyright and the Bureaucratization of Property’ 
(1992) 10 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 567; Martin Kretschmer, ‘The Failure of 
Property Rules in Collective Administration: Rethinking Copyright Societies as Regulatory 
Instruments’ (2002) 24 European Intellectual Property Review 126; Joseph P Liu, ‘Regulatory 
Copyright’ (2004) 83 North Carolina Law Review 87. More recently, Pamela Samuelson has 
proposed that 17 USC §§101−810 (2000 & Supp V, 2006) could be streamlined through more 
delegation of rule-making powers to administrative bodies: see Pamela Samuelson, ‘Preliminary 
Thoughts on Copyright Reform’ (2007) Utah Law Review (forthcoming); see also Mark A Lem-
ley and R Anthony Reese, ‘Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement without Restricting Inno-
vation’ (2004) 56 Stanford Law Review 1345 (proposing an administrative system for enforce-
ment of copyright online). 
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this Part, I will disentangle some of the threads of the reform process, highlight 
certain striking features, and identify and evaluate the complaints that were 
voiced during the period by stakeholders unhappy with the course of action 
adopted by the government. I will return, in Part IV, to the outcomes and the 
bureaucratic aspects of the changes wrought by the Copyright Amendment Act 
2006 (Cth). The history of the reforms as outlined in this Part is necessary in 
order to comprehend the driving forces which led to the shape of the resulting 
laws. 
The passage of the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) was the culmination 
of an intense period of change in Australian copyright law, resulting from the 
interaction between an existing process of domestic law reform, rapidly changing 
technology, and foreign and trade policy in the form of the AUSFTA. It is well 
known that the AUSFTA, concluded in February 2004, contained both very 
detailed obligations relating to copyright law and a strict timetable for their 
implementation,11 creating the impetus which drove rapid, wholesale amendment 
of Australian copyright law.12 However, the AUSFTA was only part of the 
picture: there was a pre-existing domestic reform agenda which the AUSFTA 
partly galvanised and partly blocked, and a whole new policy agenda 
post-AUSFTA. To understand what happened in 2006, some knowledge of the 
copyright agenda prior to the AUSFTA is necessary. 
A  The Domestic Copyright Agenda circa 2003 
It is well known that the explosion of digital technologies and the rise of the 
internet caused upheaval in copyright law globally and in Australia from at least 
the early 1990s.13 As digital reproduction and communication of copyright works 
became more commonplace, there was some legal uncertainty as to whether such 
acts of communication were covered by the international and domestic copyright 
law then in force.14 In response to these technological developments, two 
international treaties, the World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright 
Treaty15 and the WPPT16 were negotiated in 1996. Australian law subsequently 
underwent an extended process of revision to update the law and give effect to 
 
 11 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, ch 17 (entered into force 1 January 2005). 
 12 Under the AUSFTA, significant copyright provisions were required to be implemented by the 
time the agreement came into force, requiring legislation in mid-2004: see below n 40. Article 
17.12 of the AUSFTA, however, allowed Australia to delay implementation of changes to 
anti-circumvention law by two years. As the agreement came into force on 1 January 2005, the 
result was that anti-circumvention law amendments had to be in force by 1 January 2007. 
 13 It could be argued that the upheaval started sooner in the 1980s with the need to accommodate 
computer programs in copyright law. The internet, however, did not become mainstream until 
the 1990s, at which time mass copying and distribution became much more pressing issues. It 
was in 1994 that John Perry Barlow published his famous essay claiming copyright was dead: 
see John Perry Barlow, ‘The Economy of Ideas’ (March 1994) 2.03 Wired 84. 
 14 These uncertainties were discussed in a number of government documents: see especially 
Copyright Convergence Group, Highways to Change: Copyright in the New Communications 
Environment (1994); Attorney-General’s Department, Australia, ‘Copyright Reform and the 
Digital Agenda: Proposed Transmission Right, Right of Making Available and Enforcement 
Measures’ (Discussion Paper, 1997). 
 15 Opened for signature 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 65 (entered into force 6 March 2002). 
 16 Opened for signature 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 76 (entered into force 20 May 2002). 
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the treaties, culminating with the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 
2000 (Cth).17 Broadly speaking, that Act did three things: 
1 extended the exclusive rights of the copyright owner so that they clearly 
covered actions in a digital context; 
2 extended copyright exceptions and compulsory licences to the digital 
environment; and 
3 provided legal enforcement for technological protection measures 
(‘TPMs’) used to control use of copyright material in digital form (also re-
ferred to as digital rights management (‘DRM’)). 
The passage of the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) 
represented a comma, or maybe a semicolon, rather than a full stop, in copyright 
policy activity. In fact, as of February 2004, when the AUSFTA was signed, there 
were a number of copyright matters still on the agenda.18 Recommendations 
from the four most recent Copyright Law Review Committee (‘CLRC’) reports 
were outstanding:19 two reports on a reference regarding the simplification of the 
complex Copyright Act 1968 (Cth),20 and two 2002 reports, one recommending 
the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Copyright Tribunal,21 the other recom-
mending that copyright owners not be allowed to override copyright exceptions 
through contract.22 It is fair to say that no-one involved in copyright policy 
expected the recommendations of these reports to be implemented in full, with 
perhaps the exception of the less controversial Copyright Tribunal report.23  
Nevertheless, various parts of the reports could still be considered live issues 
in the sense that the government retained a commitment to respond to the 
 
 17 I have traced this history elsewhere: see Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘On Technology Locks and the 
Proper Scope of Digital Copyright Laws — Sony in the High Court’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law 
Review 613; see also David Brennan, ‘What Can It Mean to “Prevent or Inhibit the Infringement 
of Copyright”? — A Critique on Stevens v Sony’ (2006) 17 Australian Intellectual Property 
Journal 81. 
 18 In addition to the reports specifically referred to in the text: see Intellectual Property and 
Competition Review Committee, Australia, Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under 
the Competition Principles Agreement (2000), the copyright parts of which overlapped with the 
other reports noted here. 
 19 The CLRC was a part-time expert committee, appointed by the Attorney-General, to consider 
and report on copyright issues referred from time to time. The announcement that it would be 
disbanded for ‘budgetary reasons’ was made on 20 May 2005: Attorney-General’s Department, 
Australia (June 2005) 36 E-News on Copyright <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/ 
Copyright_e-NewsonCopyright_2005_Issue36-June2005>. 
 20 CLRC, Parliament of Australia, Simplification of the Copyright Act 1968 — Part 1: Exceptions 
to the Exclusive Rights of Copyright Owners (1998); CLRC, Parliament of Australia, Simplifica-
tion of the Copyright Act 1968 — Part 2: Categorisation of Subject Matter and Exclusive 
Rights, and Other Issues (1999) (‘Simplification Reports’). 
 21 CLRC, Parliament of Australia, Jurisdiction and Procedures of the Copyright Tribunal (2000). 
 22 CLRC, Parliament of Australia, Copyright and Contract (2002) [7.49]. 
 23 The Simplification Reports, above n 20, made very radical suggestions for a restructuring of 
copyright law, beyond what a government constrained by international treaty and history could 
be expected to implement. For a discussion: see Sam Ricketson, ‘Simplifying Copyright Law: 
Proposals from Down Under’ (1999) 21 European Intellectual Property Review 537. In recom-
mending that copyright owners not be allowed to override copyright exceptions via contract, the 
Copyright and Contract report was somewhat less radical, but still required a significant depar-
ture from existing practice: see CLRC, Copyright and Contract, above n 22. The AUSFTA ren-
dered many aspects of all three reports moot. 
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reports. In addition, over the course of 2003, the operation of the Copyright 
Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) was the subject of a public review, 
known as the Digital Agenda Review, conducted on behalf of the government by 
law firm Phillips Fox.24 The Review examined how the 2000 legislation was 
working, with a particular focus on questions that remained controversial:25 the 
liability of internet service providers (‘ISPs’) for infringements occurring over 
their systems; the status of temporary copies in digital memory and whether they 
fell within the copyright owner’s exclusive right to ‘reproduce’ a copyright 
work;26 and the extension of existing ‘analogue’ exceptions applicable to 
libraries and educational institutions to the digital environment.27 It also exam-
ined Australia’s anti-circumvention laws — in lay terms, ‘anti-hacking’ laws 
making it illegal to help others to circumvent TPMs used by copyright owners to 
‘lock’ and control digital content. The final report was received by the govern-
ment in February 2004.28 Happily for the government, it concluded that on the 
whole the laws were working reasonably well; perhaps less happily for a 
government in the process of trade negotiations with the US, it made a number 
of recommendations aimed at improving the position of copyright users.29 
Quite apart from all these digital issues, there were a number of other copy-
right matters in the background more related to the interests of individual 
creators. In 2002, the Report of the Contemporary Visual Arts and Crafts Inquiry 
(‘Myer Report’) had made a series of recommendations pertaining to visual arts 
and crafts.30 The Screen Directors’ Association had been lobbying for the 
creation of economic rights for film directors, to add to the moral rights intro-
duced in 2000.31 The Attorney-General’s Department had been working on 
provisions to grant economic and moral rights to performers in sound recordings 
 
 24 Phillips Fox, Digital Agenda Review: Report and Recommendations (January 2004) (‘Digital 
Agenda Review’). 
 25 See the terms of reference: ibid 121–2. 
 26 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 31. Most digital uses of material involve making temporary copies 
into the memory of devices. If temporary copies are covered by copyright, then whenever such 
copies come from unauthorised/pirate copies, the user engages in infringement. In addition, if all 
temporary copies ‘count’ for copyright purposes, then exceptions are required to allow ‘caching’ 
— the temporary, technical storage of internet content to improve the overall efficiency of 
systems. The key concept — that of ‘material form’ — had been amended in the 1980s (Copy-
right Amendment Act 1984 (Cth), amending Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)) but not during the digital 
agenda reforms in 2000. 
 27 In 2000, Australia made the (controversial, at least to owners) decision to extend various 
analogue exceptions allowing digital copying by these institutions. 
 28 The report was tabled in Parliament and released to the public in April 2004. The report included 
20 recommendations at varying levels of detail: see above n 24. 
 29 For an overview of the Digital Agenda Review’s 20 recommendations: see ibid 1–11. Recom-
mendations 15 and 17 in particular were ‘user friendly’ in ways which lay directly contrary to 
the copyright provisions known to be required by the US of its trading partners. 
 30 Commonwealth of Australia, Myer Report (2002). The Inquiry was colloquially known as the 
‘Myer Inquiry’, after the Chair, Rupert Myer. The Myer Report considered a number of the 
matters already mentioned, as well as droit de suite and special protections for indigenous moral 
rights. It recommended a narrowing of exceptions to exceptions applying to visual arts and crafts 
under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt III div 7: at recommendation 3. 
 31 The background is described in: Bills Digest No 36 2005–06: Copyright Amendment (Film 
Directors’ Rights) Bill 2005 (2005). 
     
2007] Of Copyright Bureaucracies and Incoherence 973 
     
in order to pave the way for ratification of the WPPT.32 There were also two 
issues of a more peculiarly Australian colour: first, a draft Bill to introduce 
indigenous communal moral rights;33 and secondly, a proposal to introduce a 
droit de suite — that is, a right for visual artists to receive a proportion of the 
proceeds of resale of their original artworks.34 While this second reform would 
not advantage indigenous artists exclusively, it was thought that a droit de suite 
would offer particular benefits for indigenous artists owing to the higher resale 
value of those works compared with the initial sale price.35 
In summary then, as of early 2004, various parts of Australia’s copyright laws 
had been the subject of a series of public reviews by external bodies (the CLRC, 
the Myer Inquiry, Phillips Fox), as a result of which there were many recom-
mendations and proposals sitting on the government’s ‘to do’ list. The mere fact 
that so many were sitting unaddressed for so long suggests that many were 
considered at best difficult, at worst unworkable, by the Attorney-General’s 
Department. 
B  2004: The Impact of the AUSFTA 
The AUSFTA, which was concluded in February 2004 and included a large 
intellectual property (‘IP’) chapter with extensive copyright provisions based on 
US law,36 threw a spanner in the works. With the March 2004 release of the text, 
two things became clear: first, that many of the existing proposals were moot 
because Australia’s digital copyright laws would have to be rewritten to fit US 
models37 and, secondly, that significant changes across the copyright regime 
would have to be made within six months if the treaty were to come into effect as 
planned on 1 January 2005.38 Suddenly copyright reform, usually conducted 
over a period of years, became urgent. It also became political in the sense of 
 
 32 Such provisions were required for Australia to ratify the WPPT, opened for signature 20 
December 1996, 36 ILM 76 (entered into force 20 May 2002). There had been a series of reports 
on the latter: CLRC, Parliament of Australia, Report on Performers’ Protection (1987); Brad 
Sherman and Lionel Bently, Performers’ Rights: Options for Reform (1995). Performers’ rights 
legislation due in 2003 was deferred pending the AUSFTA negotiations. 
 33 An exposure draft of the Copyright Amendment (Indigenous Communal Moral Rights) Bill 2003 
was circulated to limited stakeholders in December 2003: see Jane Anderson, ‘The Politics of 
Indigenous Knowledge: Australia’s Proposed Communal Moral Rights Bill’ (2004) 27 Univer-
sity of New South Wales Law Journal 585, 597. 
 34 A droit de suite was supported by the Myer Report: see Myer Report, above n 30, 158. A 
discussion paper on the issue was later issued: Department of Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts, Australia, ‘Proposed Resale Royalty Arrangement’ (Discussion Paper, 
2004). 
 35 See Emily Hudson and Sophie Waller, ‘Droit De Suite Down Under: Should Australia Introduce 
a Resale Royalties Scheme for Visual Artists?’ (2005) 10 Media & Arts Law Review 1. 
 36 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, ch 17 (entered into force 1 January 2005). 
 37 Attorney-General’s Department, Australia, Digital Agenda Review — Government Responses to 
Phillips Fox Recommendations and Related Matters (2006) 1. Strangely, the law firm which 
conducted the review was specifically instructed not to consider the potential impact of the 
AUSFTA: see Matthew Rimmer, ‘Robbery under Arms: Copyright Law and the Australia–United 
States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 11(3) First Monday <http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/ 
issue11_3/rimmer/index.html>. 
 38 A federal election was due in late 2004; thus laws to implement the AUSFTA would have to be 
passed in August or wait until late November 2004. The 1 January 2005 deadline was a political 
objective rather than a requirement of the agreement. 
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actually being a point of debate within, and difference between, the two major 
political parties: the legislation necessary to implement the urgent changes 
represented Parliament’s only opportunity to review and comment on the 
AUSFTA, which had itself become a source of political difference in the lead-up 
to the federal election. The government framed support for the legislation as 
shorthand for support for the Australia–US relationship.39 The legislation,40 
eventually passed in August 2004 in the dying hours of the Parliament, became a 
test of the leadership of a relatively new Labor leader, Mark Latham, in the 
lead-up to the October election. Such circumstances were hardly conducive to 
consideration of the separate merit of the changes to copyright law. 
This is a shame, because significant copyright changes were wrought by the 
legislation. It extended the copyright term;41 introduced extensive provisions 
granting economic and moral rights to performers in sound recordings of their 
live performances;42 expanded coverage of copyright to all temporary copies in 
digital memory;43 inserted a new formal ‘safe harbours’ regime limiting the 
liability of ISPs for copyright infringements in return for their adoption of a 
‘notice and takedown’ system to remove material alleged to be copy-
right-infringing;44 and slightly expanded criminal liability45 and other enforce-
ment measures.46 The content and rapid passage of this legislation intensified the 
inevitable controversy that surrounds copyright reform. In terms of content, 
some of the changes, such as the extension of the copyright term, were contrary 
to previous assessments of Australian interests.47 In terms of process, the time 
for consultation was limited; some provisions, in particular the performers’ rights 
 
 39 Tor Krever, ‘The US–Australia Free Trade Agreement: The Interface between Partisan Politics 
and National Objectives’ (2006) 41 Australian Journal of Political Science 51, 52. 
 40 US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) (‘USFTA Act’). 
 41 As required by AUSFTA, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.4 (entered 
into force 1 January 2005). The copyright term was 20 years shorter under the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) s 33. 
 42 AUSFTA, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, arts 17.1.4, 17.6 (entered into force 
1 January 2005); USFTA Act sch 9 pt 1 (economic rights), sch 9 pt 2 (moral rights). 
 43 AUSFTA, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.1 (entered into force 1 
January 2005); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 10 (definition of ‘material form’), 10(5), (6) (defini-
tion of ‘copy’). New exceptions were introduced for ordinary uses of legitimately purchased 
material: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 43B, 111B. The importance of temporary copies is noted: 
see above n 26. 
 44 AUSFTA, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.11.29 (entered into force 1 
January 2005); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt V div 2AA. 
 45 Criminal liability was extended to cover not only activities done ‘for the purpose of trade’, but 
also those done ‘for commercial advantage’ and a new offence for ‘causing significant infringe-
ments’ without any financial motive was introduced: see Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AC, 
amended by Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). 
 46 See especially USFTA Act sch 9 pt 7 (electronic rights management information), sch 9 pt 9 
(unauthorised access to encoded television). 
 47 Extension of copyright duration was contrary to the recommendation of the Intellectual Property 
and Competition Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement (2000) 84. The revisions relating to 
temporary copies and ISP safe harbours were contrary to the recommendations of the Digital 
Agenda Review, above n 24, recommendations 14–15. The adoption of IP standards higher than 
existing multilateral standards was contrary to research by the Productivity Commission: see 
John Revesz, ‘Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (Staff Research Paper, 
Productivity Commission, 1999). 
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provisions, were barely understood even as they were passed, and, in the rush, 
mistakes were made.48 
While the AUSFTA made some already pending copyright changes urgent, 
such as the adoption of performers’ rights provisions, it pushed much of the 
existing domestic reform agenda to one side. It also changed the copyright policy 
environment. The copyright amendments brought about by the AUSFTA were 
simple for critics to paint as unbalanced, because most operated to increase or 
extend copyright protection. Critics also took advantage of this brief moment of 
public attention to point out to politicians and the media that because exceptions 
to copyright under Australian law were narrow and specific, a large proportion of 
Australia’s population infringed copyright frequently. Coincidentally, this 
happened also to be a moment in time when personal copying was particularly 
salient: sales of iPod digital music players were increasing,49 and in late 2003, 
the Recording Industry Association of America had commenced a high profile 
campaign bringing lawsuits for copyright infringement against individuals in the 
US.50 Given this environment, an apparent increase in copyright protection met 
with significant media attention, much of it critical.51 Members of Parliament 
became concerned on realising they, too, were infringers:52 two parliamentary 
committees recommended that the government ‘balance’ copyright by introduc-
ing ‘fair use’, an open-ended exception in US law.53 Those committees also 
made other, broader recommendations for review, reconsideration and adjust-
ment after implementation.54 Both major political parties went to the November 
 
 48 Certain errors were corrected later in the year: see Copyright Legislation Amendment Act 2004 
(Cth). A further matter was the coverage of the ISP safe harbours. The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
pt V div 2AA confines these safe harbours to ‘carriage service providers’, which, under s 87 of 
the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), means network providers only. Other service providers, 
such as search engines and universities, and online service providers such as search engines, 
which receive the benefit of the safe harbours in the US under 17 USC §512 (2000 & Supp V, 
2006), are thus excluded. The release in 2005 of a discussion paper on whether the safe harbours 
should be broadened suggests that the initial narrow coverage was, if not a mistake, at least an 
ill-considered policy decision: see Attorney-General’s Department, Australia, Part V Division 
2AA of the Copyright Act 1968 Limitation on Remedies Available against Carriage Service 
Providers: Does the Scheme Need to Be Expanded? (Issues Paper, 2005). 
 49 Sales of iPods increased from under 23 000 in the first quarter of 2004, to more than 330 000 in 
2005: see Jim Dickins, ‘iPod Sales a Sour Note for the Disc’, The Sunday Telegraph (Sydney), 
12 June 2005, 93, 95. 
 50 Lawsuits against individuals commenced in September 2003 in the US: see Matthew Sag, 
‘Piracy: Twelve-Year Olds, Grandmothers, and Other Good Targets for the Recording Industry’ 
(2006) 4 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 133. No individuals had 
been sued in Australia at the time. 
 51 See, eg, Peter Martin, ‘The FTA Clause That Stifles Creativity’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 14 April 2004, 13; ‘Paying Price of Free Trade’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 27 July 
2004, 12; Bruce McCabe, ‘FTA Leaves Us Second among Equals’, The Australian (Sydney), 31 
August 2004, C02; Ross Gittins, ‘Costs Aplenty in “Free” Trade IP Deals with US’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney), 24 July 2004, 46; Ross Gittins, ‘Trade Deal a Free Kick for US 
Software Racketeers’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 2 August 2004, 34; Ross Gittins, 
‘Selling off a Slice of Our Country’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 11 August 2004, 17. 
 52 ‘You have now given me a huge guilt burden. I am in breach, I am a serial offender’: Common-
wealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 May 2004, 87 (Peter Cook). 
 53 17 USC §107 (2000 & Supp V, 2006). 
 54 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Report 61: Australia–United 
States Free Trade Agreement (2004) xx–xxi. See also the recommendations of the Labor sena-
tors (there were no majority recommendations) in Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade 
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2004 federal election campaign with policies promising a review of this issue.55 
Copyright reform was enjoying a rare moment on the political agenda, and for 
once it had both a publicly salient issue (mass infringement by the Australian 
public) and a deadline for change: the end of 2006, when the next and final 
round of AUSFTA-led amendments was due.56 
One final impact of the AUSFTA on copyright reform should be noted — 
namely, its effect on the government departments involved in copyright policy. 
Most important was perhaps the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (‘DFAT’) during negotiation of the AUSFTA.57 The intertwining of 
international law, international trade and copyright policy is of course not new: 
only a few years before, copyright, along with other IP matters, had been 
included as part of the obligations of membership in the world’s largest and most 
important international trade organisation, the World Trade Organization 
(‘WTO’).58 However, in that case, the copyright obligations were almost entirely 
consistent with existing Australian domestic law, and so the Australian trade 
negotiators did not have to agree to large scale changes to Australian law.59 The 
AUSFTA was a very different kettle of fish, and while it would be incorrect to 
assume that there are clear institutional lines between departments — indeed, 
during the negotiation of the AUSFTA it is clear that staff with expertise in 
copyright were consulted and in some cases seconded to the negotiating team60 
— nevertheless, it was the Minister for Trade, Mark Vaile, and DFAT who had 
primary responsibility for getting the AUSFTA signed, sealed and delivered, and 
to achieve this, last-minute concessions on copyright were made.61 The impact of 
DFAT’s involvement is open to further investigation, but there must have been 
 
Agreement between Australia and the United States of America, Parliament of Australia, Final 
Report (2004) 230–2 (‘SSCFTA Report’). 
 55 The Howard Government Election 2004 Policy Strengthening Australian Arts (4 October 2004) 
The Liberal Party of Australia <http://www.liberal.org.au/documents/Oct04_Strengthening 
_Australian_Arts.pdf> 22. The 2004 Labor Party policy on copyright is no longer available on 
the Labor Party website, but it is reproduced in Collette Ormond, ‘Copyright Overboard? The 
Debate after the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement’ (October 2004) 10 inCite 
<http://www.alia.org.au/publishing/incite/2004/10/copyright.html>. 
 56 AUSFTA, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.12 (entered into force 1 
January 2005). 
 57 Copyright law in Australia has always had an international aspect to it, but at least in recent 
memory, it has been officers from the Attorney-General’s Department copyright law branch who 
have been most vitally concerned with international IP matters at the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (‘WIPO’). 
 58 Intellectual property obligations are included in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3, annex 1C 
(Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) (entered into force 1 
January 1995) (‘TRIPS’). All members of the WTO must sign up to TRIPS: at arts XI–XII. 
 59 Amendments to Australia’s copyright law following the WTO negotiations consisted only of the 
introduction of a rental right (as required by TRIPS art 11), amendment to performers’ rights (as 
required by TRIPS art 14), and the regime for customs seizure (as required by TRIPS pt III s 4): 
see Copyright (World Trade Organization Amendments) Act 1994 (Cth). These are minor 
changes when compared with what has occurred after the AUSFTA. 
 60 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 December 2005, 28 
(Helen Daniels) (noting that the Attorney-General’s Department ‘was part of’ the AUSFTA 
negotiations). 
 61 See Letter from Mark Vaile (Minister for Trade) to Robert Zoellick (United States Trade 
Representative), 17 November 2004 <http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia 
_FTA/Implementation/Section_Index.html>. 
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some: the attitude towards copyright of trade negotiators for whom IP is one of 
many horses to trade could not possibly be the same as that of those who have 
spent much of their professional lives dealing with copyright and walking the 
halls of the WIPO.62 Moreover, in the post-AUSFTA period of copyright reform, 
government officers with an international law rather than a copyright back-
ground were highly visible.63 From the outside, this appeared to have the effect 
of increasing the focus on treaty text at the expense of copyright policy goals. At 
around the same time, following the 2004 election, responsibility for copyright 
was removed from the purview of the Department of Communications, Informa-
tion Technology and the Arts (‘DCITA’) — likely reducing the influence of those 
government officials most connected, and sympathetic to, the concerns of 
telecommunications companies, ISPs, galleries and archives.64 While it is 
beyond the scope of this article to trace the full impact of these changes, it is a 
notable element of the overall changes to the copyright system. 
C  2005: The Year of the Never-Ending Copyright Review 
With the Howard Coalition government re-elected in October 2004, election 
promises of review and reform to keep, and with a late 2006 deadline, 2005 
posed an interesting problem for the Attorney-General.65 On the one hand, 
copyright reform was needed and public and stakeholder interest was high. On 
the other hand, the constraints imposed by AUSFTA and other treaties were 
strong, the deadline was tight — and as already noted, past public reviews by 
independent bodies such as the CLRC had not been notable for generating quick, 
workable legal reforms. Handing over the issues to an independent, public 
review body such as the CLRC or a parliamentary committee held significant 
risks. 
The solution adopted by the Howard government was to take the reform proc-
ess in-house. In early 2005, the government announced that the existing inde-
pendent body with a remit to consider copyright law reform, the CLRC, would 
 
 62 We could speculate that international lawyers without a background in copyright focus more 
specifically on the agreement text, in line with the interpretive principles in the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, arts 31–2 
(entered into force 27 January 1980). 
 63 This can be seen in the presence of a senior officer from the Office of International Law, Mark 
Jennings, in government evidence to the TPM Inquiry. The internal process in the department 
was described as follows: ‘whereas before we would be able to formulate a policy position, now 
we have to be certain that it complies or is consistent with Australia’s obligations under the 
agreement’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 December 
2005, 31 (Peter Treyde), 22 (Helen Daniels). Perhaps the most curious issue is whether some of 
the later 2006 amendments were driven by the concerns of international lawyers. In particular, 
amendments to Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 40 (fair dealing) which did not appear to have been 
sought by any stakeholder group, but which may have arisen from a concern that the exception 
was not sufficiently ‘certain’ to comply with TRIPS art 13: see Submission to Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Copyright 
Amendment Bill 2006, 1 November 2006, Submission No 58, 3 (Australian Vice-Chancellors’ 
Committee). 
 64 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No S 518, 17 December 2004, 10. 
 65 One actual amendment occurred: film directors were given certain extremely limited economic 
rights in their films: Copyright Amendment (Film Directors’ Rights) Act 2005 (Cth), passed in 
October 2005: see Bills Digest, above n 31, for background. 
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be disbanded.66 From the government’s perspective the in-house approach would 
have had the advantage that the Attorney-General’s Department would have to 
generate working legislation. The presence of such an imperative tends to focus 
the mind on what, exactly, is possible given the constraints of the various 
copyright treaties and local and international political considerations. 
The Attorney-General’s Department then released a stream of issues papers on 
copyright questions: how much radio broadcasters should pay for playing music 
(February),67 whether unauthorised access to pay television should be criminal-
ised (May),68 and which entities providing facilities for online communication 
should be able to use the statutory safe harbours (August).69 Drawing the most 
public attention was an inquiry, announced in May 2005, into whether Australia’s 
copyright exceptions should be extended to allow private copying. This review 
became known colloquially as the ‘iPod Inquiry’, because a key question to be 
addressed was whether copying for private enjoyment should be legalised, 
although here it will be referred to by the term used by the government — the 
Fair Use Review.70 
Some of the reviews were related to the AUSFTA, others not at all. The Fair 
Use Review fell somewhere in between: changes to exceptions were not required 
by the AUSFTA, but the proposal to expand exceptions was a domestic response 
to the perceived strengthening of copyright occasioned by the AUSFTA.71 This 
same Review gave the Attorney-General his ‘theme’ that copyright should be 
‘fairer for users and tougher on pirates’, which, although adopted for this 
particular Review, was used generally and consistently for the next two years.72 
 
 66 See above n 19. 
 67 Attorney-General’s Department, Australia, ‘Review of One per Cent Cap on Licence Fees Paid 
to Copyright Owners for Playing Sound Recordings on the Radio’ (Discussion Paper, February 
2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Publications_Reviewofonepercentcapon 
licencefees-February2005>. 
 68 Attorney-General’s Department, Australia, ‘Policy Review Concerning Unauthorised Access to 
and Use of Subscription Broadcasts’ (Discussion Paper, 2005). 
 69 As noted below, no public announcement of this review was ever made and a discussion paper, 
while created, was never made publicly available, although it was noted on several web logs: 
see, eg, Warwick A Rothnie, Review of Online Service Provider Liabilities (2005) IPWar’s 
<http://homepage.mac.com/wrothnie/iblog/archives/2005/8/index.html>. 
 70 Attorney-General’s Department, Australia, ‘Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions: An 
Examination of Fair Use, Fair Dealing and Other Exceptions in the Digital Age’ (Issues Paper, 
2005) (‘Fair Use Review’). 
 71 The word ‘perceived’ here is used advisedly as the actual ‘strengthening’ which occurred was 
arguably relatively minor: see Robert Burrell and Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘Exporting Contro-
versy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the US–Australia Free Trade Agreement: Les-
sons for US Trade Policy’ (Working Paper No 07-13, T C Beirne School of Law, The University 
of Queensland, 2007). 
 72 This was to become the theme of the reforms, which the Attorney-General reiterated in a series 
of speeches and press releases over the next two years: see, eg, Philip Ruddock, Attor-
ney-General of Australia, ‘Government Examines Fair Use of Copyright Material’ (Press Re-
lease, 5 May 2005); Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General of Australia, ‘A More Flexible Copyright 
Regime’ (Press Release, 19 October 2006); Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General of Australia, 
‘Copyright Gift for Consumers’ (Press Release, 12 December 2006); Philip Ruddock, Attor-
ney-General of Australia, ‘Fair Use and Copyright in Australia’ (2007) 25(2) Communications 
Law Bulletin 4. See also the second reading speech to the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 
(Cth): Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 October 2006, 1–2 
(Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General). 
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The choice of taking the reviews ‘in-Department’ — while undoubtedly bene-
ficial for ‘getting things done’ — had a number of implications. The various 
reviews, while simultaneous, were not conducted as a single process: on the 
contrary, the number of separate reviews with separate issues papers disaggre-
gated copyright by treating the issues as if they were unrelated.73 More impor-
tantly, the decision reduced opportunities for public debate and dialogue: there 
were no official public hearings in which opposing views could be explored, and 
submissions were not made available for others to evaluate and respond. It was a 
process that favoured established copyright stakeholders already identified as 
such by the Attorney-General’s Department, and accustomed to lobbying the 
Minister and Department: collecting societies, and the larger user institutions in 
particular. 
In addition, there were other features of the individual reviews that had the 
effect of limiting the opportunities for public dialogue. For the Subscription 
Television Review,74 the period between release of the issues paper and the due 
date for submissions was a mere three weeks, and the government’s final 
decision was published one week later. In these circumstances, an observer could 
be forgiven for thinking that the public review was at best tokenistic.75 The 
review on the scope of the safe harbours was not publicly announced:76 certain 
chosen stakeholders, albeit ones across a range of views, were sent a paper copy 
of a discussion paper,77 which was never made available online. Even more 
strangely, the issue has since disappeared from the agenda. In the Fair Use 
Review, despite considerable public interest reflected in media coverage, there 
were no hearings, and submissions disappeared into the Attorney-General’s 
Department and were only published six months later after repeated requests.78 
To some extent, the wider community interested in copyright moved to fill the 
void: public debates and seminars, which were always attended by government 
representatives, were held by various groups, although this is hardly a substi-
tute.79 In summary, while there was consultation with stakeholders, what was 
 
 73 For comments related to the disaggregation: see, eg, House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Review of Technologi-
cal Protection Measures Exceptions (2006) 17–18, 128–9 (‘TPM Inquiry Report’). 
 74 See above n 68 and accompanying text. 
 75 The observer might also infer the purpose of the review was to comply with undertakings given 
by the Trade Minister, Mark Vaile, in November 2004: see Vaile, above n 61. 
 76 See above n 69. 
 77 It is not suggested that the group selected for consultation was biased towards 
over-representation of any viewpoint or group. Users such as universities, owners, ISP represen-
tative groups and search engines were consulted, as well as more independent experts including 
barrister and copyright author, Warwick Rothnie, and me. It is, however, unusual to create a 
discussion paper which is not made generally available. 
 78 Once the government had reached a broad policy approach, it consulted confidentially with a 
selected group of stakeholders, including representatives of both owners and users in December 
2005: see Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Austra-
lia, Provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (2006) 68 (‘SSCLCA Final Report’). A list 
of who was consulted is not publicly available. 
 79 Events were held, inter alia, by the Copyright Society, IPRIA and the Centre for Media and 
Communications Law: see IPRIA, Past Events (26 July 2007) IPRIA <http://www.ipria.org/ 
events/#events05>. A number of speakers also presented papers on the issue at the Copyright 
Society’s 12th Biennial Conference, 17–18 November 2005: see Australian Copyright Council, 
Copyright Symposium 2005: Speakers and Papers (23 February 2006) Australian Copyright 
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missing was the public dialogue and public exchange of opposing views in any 
forum designed to feed into the policy process. Also missing were final reports 
discussing the issues or explaining the reasons for the approaches rejected, or 
adopted, in the final legislation. Given the degree of controversy surrounding 
these issues, and the varied views, the abstract and high-level comments in 
Explanatory Memoranda are scarcely a sufficient substitute. 
There was one exception to this general approach. Later in 2005, the govern-
ment announced that the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs would conduct an investigation into what exceptions 
were necessary to the anti-hacking provisions which Australia would have to 
introduce as a result of the AUSFTA,80 the TPM Inquiry. Here at least there was 
an independent body tasked with undertaking the review, as well as public 
hearings and the publication of opposing submissions. Perhaps this more public 
process was conducted in recognition of the fact that this, of all the areas of 
copyright under review, was potentially the most controversial: on the one hand, 
there was a need to comply with the highly prescriptive provisions of the 
AUSFTA modelled on US law; on the other, there was a desire to take into 
account Australian interests and to avoid wholesale adoption of the US model, 
which was known to be controversial even in the US.81 Nevertheless, this 
process, too, had distinct oddities that devalued the public dialogue presumably 
intended when the inquiry was established. A committee of members of Parlia-
ment, not expert in either technology or copyright law, was invited to examine 
the most complicated area of interaction between the two. The Committee was 
asked to propose exceptions to a prohibition that had not yet been drafted.82 
When, in the event, the Committee took a broad approach to its mandate,83 
considering the broader public interests involved, the ministerial and departmen-
tal response was to assert that the Committee had gone beyond its terms of 
reference, that in certain respects the approach of the Committee and its interpre-
 
Council <http://www.copyright.org.au/training/conferences/past-conferences/symposium2005/ 
symposium.htm>. 
 80 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.7 (entered into force 1 January 2005). 
 81 The government distanced itself from US models: see Evidence to Senate Select Committee on 
the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the United States of America, Parliament of 
Australia, Canberra, 3 June 2004, 67 (Stephen Deady, DFAT); see also Evidence to House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Austra-
lia, Canberra, 5 December 2005, 29 (Helen Daniels). In addition, AUSFTA itself calls for a 
‘legislative or administrative review or proceeding’, which may suggest something more formal 
than a ‘discussion paper’ circulated from within a government department: see ibid 
art 17.4.7(e)(viii). 
 82 The Attorney-General’s justification for this approach was that ‘[t]his was a complex area in 
which I felt it was desirable that the parliament addressed its mind to these questions before we 
saw a complex bill’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 
November 2006, 47 (Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General). A legal expert was also seconded from 
the Attorney-General’s Department to assist the Committee. In the event, the wisdom of the 
approach is at least questionable and the problems are discussed in the final report: see House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, TPM Inquiry Report, 
above n 73, 3–5. 
 83 An approach which can hardly have been surprising, given a committee made up of legislators 
whose primary task, most of the time, is making decisions on matters of public policy: see 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 November 2006, 39 
(Duncan Kerr). 
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tation of the AUSFTA was incorrect,84 and that, as a result, whole sections of the 
report should be rejected. 
One final review deserves mention: in the course of 2005–06, the Attor-
ney-General’s Department undertook what was described as a technical review 
of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to ensure that the criminal law provisions were 
consistent with federal criminal law policy and drafting.85 This review, too, was 
not required by anything in the AUSFTA. It led to the decisions discussed below 
to change the system of copyright enforcement. This review was conducted in a 
way that can only be described as secretive: its existence was not widely 
publicised; its scope was described as largely ‘technical’ until mid-2006, when it 
appears the decisions had already been made, and even then the limited detail 
provided publicly meant its scope was downplayed;86 and no issues paper was 
ever released. Most importantly, the small group of stakeholders consulted along 
the way was not representative,87 but consisted of the government-only IP 
Enforcement Interdepartmental Committee88 and the IP Enforcement Consulta-
tive Group, a committee made up of representatives from four interest groups: 
law enforcement, government, prosecution agencies, and industry (that is, 
copyright owners).89 A notable exclusion from those consulted was any represen-
tative of users, whether institutional or individual; nor were other interested 
industries such as the telecommunications industry included. It is perhaps not 
surprising that it was this area which became the most controversial of the 
reforms in 2006. 
 
 84 See above n 77 and accompanying text. 
 85 Fiona Phillips, Intellectual Property Enforcement in Australia — An Evolving Approach, [28], 
WIPO Doc WIPO/ACE/3/10 (2006). 
 86 Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General of Australia, ‘Major Copyright Reforms Strike Balance’ 
(Press Release, 14 May 2006). The Attorney-General mentioned in a speech in late 2005 that 
there was an ongoing review regarding the criminal offences, however, its scope was not ex-
plained at that time: see Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General of Australia, ‘Opening Address — 
Copyright Law and Practice Symposium’ (Speech delivered at the Copyright Law and Practice 
Symposium, Australian National Maritime Museum, Sydney, 17 November 2005). The May 
2006 press release did reveal that there would be on-the-spot fines — but not that they would 
apply effectively across the board in copyright law as the October 2006 draft revealed. These 
discrepancies meant that in fact it cannot be said that the changes to criminal law were truly 
revealed before October 2006 to anyone but a limited, biased set of stakeholders. 
 87 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, SSCLCA Final Report, 
above n 78, 65. There were submissions to the inquiry arguing that there had been inadequate 
public consultation in relation to parts of the Bill: at 12–13. 
 88 The IP Enforcement Interdepartmental Committee consists of representatives of the Attor-
ney-General’s Department (chair), the Australian Federal Police, the Office of the Common-
wealth Director of Public Prosecutions, IP Australia, the Australian Customs Service, DFAT and 
the Australian Crime Commission. 
 89 Membership from industry varies, but generally includes the Australian Federation against 
Copyright Theft, Music Industry Piracy Investigations, Business Software Association of Austra-
lia, Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Interactive Entertainment Asso-
ciation of Australia, Trade Mark Investigations Service, Australian Toy Association, Australian 
Sporting Goods Association, Anti-Counterfeiting Action Group and Aristocrat Technologies 
Australia Proprietary Limited: email from Sam Ahlin (Senior Legal Officer, Attorney-General’s 
Department) to Kimberlee Weatherall, 9 July 2007. 
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D  2006: End Game 
The first half of 2006 was deceptively quiet in public — no new reviews or 
policy decisions were announced — although no doubt the Attorney-General’s 
Department was busy. Then in May 2006, the Attorney-General announced the 
outcomes of the Fair Use Review in the form of a press release with limited 
detail,90 and published his Department’s more detailed response91 to the 2004 
Digital Agenda Review.92 
The real action started on 8 September 2006 when the government released an 
exposure draft of the new anti-hacking laws, generating another flurry of 
submissions.93 On 22 September 2006, two more exposure drafts were released, 
one proposing a series of new exceptions to copyright infringement (that is, 
comprising the outcomes of the Fair Use Review),94 the other a rewrite of the 
criminal provisions in copyright law.95 The first amended several of the existing 
exceptions, but more importantly, introduced a series of new ones for private 
copying (of music, television broadcasts and literary works), parody and satire, 
and the making of preservation copies of ‘significant works’, as well as a new 
open-ended exception for certain activities by public institutions. The second 
exposure draft represented a radical rewriting of criminal laws in copyright.96 By 
releasing these two drafts, the government was able to re-emphasise its favoured 
themes: copyright should be fairer for consumers, who benefited from the 
sudden legalisation of many ordinary activities like taping television and using 
iPods, and harsher for copyright pirates.97 There was, however, a great deal more 
to the legislation. In the event, on 19 October 2006, the full 215-page Copyright 
 
 90 Ruddock, ‘Major Copyright Reforms Strike Balance’, above n 86. 
 91 Attorney-General’s Department, Australia, Digital Agenda Review — Government Responses to 
Phillips Fox, above n 37. 
 92 Phillips Fox, Digital Agenda Review, above n 24. 
 93 Copyright Amendment (Technological Protection Measures) Bill 2006 (Cth); Exposure Draft: 
Copyright Amendment Regulations 2006 (Cth). The submissions are attached to the Attor-
ney-General’s Department Supplementary Submission: see Supplementary Submission to Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Inquiry into the Provisions of the 
Copyright Amendment Bill 2006, 8 November 2006, Submission No 69B (Attorney-General’s 
Department). 
 94 The exposure drafts relating to exceptions, digital agenda review measures, and enforcement are 
no longer available online. However, it may be noted that in these areas, the exposure draft 
provisions were left unchanged prior to their introduction as part of the Copyright Amendment 
Bill 2006 (Cth), unlike the technological protection measure provisions referred to in 
above n 93, which changed considerably. The Exposure Draft: Copyright Amendment (Techno-
logical Protection Measures) Bill 2006 (Cth) remains available on the website of the Attor-
ney-General’s Department as at the time of writing: Attorney-General’s Department, Australian 
Government, Copyright Amendment (Technological Protection Measures) Bill 2006 and Related 
Regulations — Exposure Drafts (2006) <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Publica-
tions_CopyrightAmendment(TechnologicalProtectionMeasures)Bill2006andrelatedRegulations-
ExposureDrafts>. 
 95 This was not the last: another exposure draft dealing with the jurisdiction of the Copyright 
Tribunal was released on 11 October 2006. 
 96 This is discussed further: see below Part IV(B). 
 97 One difficulty is that the rationale is an incomplete explanation of the legislation, which drew 
unexplained distinctions between different kinds of works. Moreover, as the government quickly 
discovered, its attempt to make the laws ‘tougher for pirates’ also, incidentally, extended crimi-
nal liability to ordinary consumer behaviour. To keep its message consistent, the government 
was forced to amend sch 1 extensively. 
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Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) was tabled in Parliament. The final Bill consisted of 
12 schedules, including the drafts already released, plus reforms to the statutory 
licences for libraries and educational institutions, evidential presumptions and 
the jurisdiction of the Copyright Tribunal: responses, in other words, to some of 
the various reviews which had been on the agenda as at the beginning of 2004, in 
particular the Digital Agenda Review (by now effectively three years old) and the 
CLRC Report on the Copyright Tribunal. 
It is not clear at what point the decision was made by the government to pass 
so many changes to copyright law at once, although passing a single, omnibus 
copyright-amending Act may have seemed a ‘now or never’ proposition. Some 
reforms to copyright were required by the AUSFTA, providing a tangible 
deadline;98 and 2007 would be an election year, making it difficult to get 
copyright back on the already crowded legislative agenda. Passage was all but 
guaranteed without negotiation owing to government control of both Houses of 
Parliament.99 The decision to pass the legislation in this way is thus understand-
able, but again had important implications for public dialogue and media 
coverage. A great deal of complicated draft legislation was published all at once. 
The time for review, discussion, and amendment was drastically truncated. The 
Bill was referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, which was given 16 working days to issue a final report. The Committee 
called for submissions by 30 October, and hastily organised a hearing on 7 
November — not only Melbourne Cup Day but also the same day that the Senate 
was debating sensitive legislation relating to stem cell research.100 As the 
Committee noted, many complaints were made about the truncated period for 
reviewing the complex statutory language,101 charges echoed strongly by the 
Labor opposition and members of the minor parties in the parliamentary de-
bate.102 
The effect of the truncated timetable was made worse by the fact that, before 
long, errors and unintended effects were discovered in the complex statutory 
language.103 First drafts are seldom perfect, and the Copyright Amendment Bill 
 
 98 See above n 12. 
 99 It is interesting to speculate whether the process would have been different were it not for this 
power to pass without reference to other parties. Notably, both minor parties and the Labor party 
proposed amendments during debate: see below n 108. However, we must be careful not to 
assume that amendments would have occurred. More extensive proposals for amendment can 
safely be made by minor parties when the government has the numbers to pass legislation re-
gardless. 
100 Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research 
Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth). 
101 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, SSCLCA Final Report, 
above n 78, 13–14. 
102 See, eg, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 November 2006, 
30 (Nicola Roxon, Shadow Attorney-General); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 
29 November 2006, 36 (Joseph Ludwig) (‘botched process’), 38 (Labor motion), 39–40 (An-
drew Bartlett) (‘derisory’, ‘little short of a disgrace’, ‘seriously flawed’), 107, 111 (Patricia 
Crossin); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 30 November 2006, 152 (Joseph 
Ludwig), noting that ‘[m]ost of the submitters complained [about the] truncated process’. 
103 Cf Jessica Litman, ‘War and Peace’ (2006) 53 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 1, 7: 
‘In recent years, it has seemed as if negotiations over copyright amendments have lasted long 
enough to generate language that is long, complicated, counterintuitive and difficult to under-
stand, but not long enough to produce a well-written second draft.’ 
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2006 (Cth) was no exception: for example, it was discovered that the legislation, 
intended to allow consumers to copy music onto digital music players, would, 
owing to limitations in its drafting, fail to legitimise ordinary use of the dominant 
player, the iPod.104 But it was the criminal laws in particular which generated the 
most concern from the general public because they introduced strict liability 
offences which created potential liability in the absence of any intent or even 
knowledge of infringement, and appeared to cast the net of criminality very 
broadly. It did not take critics long to identify a range of apparently harmless 
situations where the legislation would make acts ‘criminal’. Media attention 
followed, with front page stories claiming that kids using mobile phones to 
record moments from U2 concerts would face fines in excess of $1000.105 
The prospect of criminalising ‘ordinary’ behaviour caused concern to members 
of Parliament.106 These concerns did not go unheard. Following the Committee’s 
report on 13 November 2006, the government circulated two sets of amendments 
on 28 and 30 November 2006, aimed at removing some of the criminal offences 
and fixing obvious drafting problems.107 The final set of amendments were 
produced on 30 November 2006 — the night before the Act was passed without 
further debate by the Senate on 1 December 2006. In the end, the Labor opposi-
tion, with some reservations, supported passage of the Bill — although not 
before they had unsuccessfully proposed a number of amendments.108 The 
amended Bill passed the House of Representatives on 5 December 2006 and 
received Royal Assent on 11 December 2006. With its passage, a stormy chapter 
in Australian copyright reform drew to a close. However, it is worth noting, once 
again, that a considerable part of the 2003 agenda, including Australian matters 
such as indigenous communal moral rights, were (and remain) sidelined.109 
 
104 Another example was the proposed amendment to Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 40, which would 
have imposed an unintended quantitative cap of 10 per cent on copying for research or study: 
see Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) 
[63]–[69]; Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, In-
quiry into the Provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006, 10 November 2006, Submis-
sion No 52, 1–2 (Flexible Learning Advisory Group). See also Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 
(Cth) sch 6 cl 11. 
105 At the time, U2 were touring the country and images were published of hundreds of concert-
goers holding up mobile phones: see Lisa Murray, ‘Hold Those Phones, Rockers, Soon Your 
Recordings Will Be a Crime’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 14 November 2006, 1; see 
also Simon Hayes, ‘Poddies Still Crooks under Copyright Law’, The Australian (Sydney), 21 
November 2006, 27. 
106 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 November 2006, 36–7 (Joseph Ludwig); 
102–3 (Kate Lundy); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 
December 2006, 65 (Nicola Roxon, Shadow Attorney-General). 
107 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth); Further 
Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth). 
108 The Labor opposition proposed amendments to the anti-circumvention provisions, and urged 
that some provisions be removed pending further consultation: Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, Senate, 30 November 2006, 153–4, 167 (Joseph Ludwig); 175, 178 (Kate Lundy). The 
Greens and Democrats opposed the passage of the legislation. 
109 These sidelined issues include: reforms to the scope of the ISP safe harbours; indigenous 
communal moral rights; the removal of the one per cent cap on remuneration for broadcast of 
sound recordings; digital legal deposit issues; and the recommendations of the CLRC: Com-
monwealth Parliament, Crown Copyright (2005). In May 2006, proposals for a droit de suite 
were quietly shelved: Attorney-General and Minister for the Arts and Sport, ‘New Support for 
Australia’s Visual Artists’ (Press Release, 9 May 2006). Some interest groups continue to press 
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III   UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORY AND ITS  IMPLICATIONS 
As the previous Part has sought to demonstrate, the period 2003–06 was con-
troversial and intense in Australian copyright policy circles. Significant changes 
occurred over a short period of time. It is only by laying out the detail of the 
many intersecting threads that a true sense of the process which led to the 
Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) can be achieved. It was not straightfor-
ward and, importantly, was not a simple case of implementing the AUSFTA or 
following a single path of domestic reform. Rather, changes required by the 
AUSFTA interacted with a series of formally unrelated domestic reviews. The 
2003–06 period also marked a shift in the mechanisms used to achieve copyright 
reform. The process of review and consultation, previously undertaken by 
independent bodies like the CLRC or ad hoc committees, was taken within the 
bowels of the Attorney-General’s Department and Minister’s office, and con-
ducted ‘distantly’, through a series of discussion papers and submissions, rather 
than via public hearing. The shift in approach had a number of implications. 
One is that the ‘behind closed doors’ nature of the process favoured established 
stakeholders already accustomed to lobbying the Minister and Attor-
ney-General’s Department, such as collecting societies, the (owner-oriented) 
Australian Copyright Council, and on the ‘user’ side, the larger institutional 
users such as the schools, universities and libraries. The importance of negotia-
tions between stakeholders appeared to be increased; that of public participation 
and of legislators as representatives of the public downgraded. 
A further result of this confused, truncated and piecemeal process is that no 
coherent theory or theories can be found to inform the recent changes; on the 
contrary, parts of the Act seem to be at war with each other.110 It can thus fairly 
be said that the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), and the 2004 amend-
ments, did not give the appearance, let alone the reality, of being the outcome of 
a holistic appraisal of the best law for Australian cultural and economic interests. 
Existing initiatives focusing on local concerns, such as indigenous artistic 
interests, were sidelined, and many of the reforms made were contrary to past 
assessments of Australia’s national interest, or, as in the case of digital copyright, 
involved the abandonment of hard-fought native compromises. While some 
departure from local Australian concerns was inevitable given the need to 
implement detailed copyright provisions in the AUSFTA, one might at least have 
hoped that there would be an attempt to ensure general coherence between the 
parts of the Act dictated by AUSFTA and the other reforms. 
That is not, however, the case. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Copy-
right Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) identifies a series of ‘principles’ said to have 
guided the reforms, which echo the theme of the reforms stated repeatedly by the 
Attorney-General (‘fairer for consumers and tougher for pirates’).111 But there 
 
the idea: Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Communications, Information Technol-
ogy and the Arts, Indigenous Art: Securing the Future (2007) 159–76. 
110 On the difficulty of interpreting the highly complex provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth): 
see Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 224 CLR 193, 207–8 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 230–2 (McHugh J). 
111 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) 1. The objectives of the 
Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) refer to ‘supporting the copyright industry’, the develop-
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are whole swathes of the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) which bear no 
arguable relation to either the principles in the Memorandum or that theme.112 
Indeed, at times the government even adopted diametrically opposed approaches 
without explanation. Consider, for example, the goal of technology-neutral laws 
— that is, laws which apply equally across different forms of technology and 
which do not require amendment when new technologies are introduced. The 
new personal copying amendments in sch 6, as discussed below, are the opposite 
of technology-neutral: they are specifically written to apply to particular 
personal technologies. At the same time, technological neutrality is used as a 
justification for other new provisions in the Act.113 This is one example of 
tension in the drafting approaches, but by no means the only one.114 Is it any 
wonder that stakeholders and the media were confused? 
In this respect, a comparison with the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) 
Act 2000 (Cth) is instructive. The objectives of that Act made reference to the 
policy aims of copyright traditionally conceived: improving protection for 
copyright owners ‘in order to reward creative endeavour and encourage further 
creative endeavours’, while ensuring that users have ‘reasonable access’ to 
copyright material, as well as providing certainty for ISPs, and writing laws in a 
technology-neutral way ‘so that amendments to the Act are not needed each time 
there is a development in technology’.115 These objectives were broadly applica-
ble to the whole of the amending Act. While it could be argued that the Copy-
right Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) amendments were more likely 
to be coherent, because they were the result of a single review (rather than 
many), that only begs the question: why was the review process that gave birth to 
the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) so disjointed? If the United Kingdom 
can appoint one committee — the Gowers Committee — to examine all of its IP 
law in a year, Australia could surely have done the same for copyright. 
 
ment of digital markets and protecting consumers’ ‘reasonable use’. There is no reference to 
more traditional copyright policy objectives, such as encouraging creativity, rewarding creators, 
or ensuring access to copyright works. 
112 See especially Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) schs 6–8, 10–11. It would be tempting to 
see these other areas as the outcome of interest group bargaining between collecting societies 
and institutional users. However, parts of the Bill appear to have been a surprise to stakeholders. 
Cf Jessica Litman argues that US legislators ‘delegated’ the writing of copyright legislation to 
industry interest groups: Jessica Litman, ‘Copyright Legislation and Technological Change’ 
(1989) 68 Oregon Law Review 275, 278; Jessica D Litman, ‘Copyright, Compromise, and Legis-
lative History’ (1987) 72 Cornell Law Review 857, 869; Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright: 
Protecting Intellectual Property on the Internet (2001). See also William Patry, ‘The Failure of 
the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich’ (1997) 72 Notre Dame Law Review 
907, 909. 
113 In particular, the introduction of Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ZMDA and the amendments to 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ZMB: see Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) sch 8 cll 7, 9. 
114 Consider, for example, the accommodation between ‘certainty’ and ‘flexibility’ in the drafting of 
copyright exceptions. According to the Attorney-General, Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 200AB 
provided ‘flexibility’ to public institutions, and consumers were granted inflexible, but ‘certain’, 
personal copying exceptions: see Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Con-
stitutional Affairs, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006, 8 Novem-
ber 2006, Submission No 69A, 2 (Attorney-General’s Department). If this indicates trust in 
public institutions, it is inconsistently applied. Other parts of the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 
(Cth) specifically removed ‘flexibility’ for public institutions: see amendments to Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) s 51A; Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) 122. 
115 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 (Cth) 7. 
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In any event, the claim being made here is not that a single, coherent theory 
ought to inform the whole of copyright law: that would be impossible. Rather, 
the claim is that the outcome of the confused, disaggregated process described 
above was a series of piecemeal amendments, not informed by any common 
theories, or public policy objectives, and which are at times inconsistent in their 
approach — if not contradictory. The failure to state guiding principles which 
sensibly relate to the whole Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) is indicative of a deeper 
failure to think through the policy goals — particularly in those areas beyond the 
immediate political focus of the Attorney-General. Leaving to one side the 
domestic copyright agenda, in those areas of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) where 
Australian law was amended to comply with the AUSFTA, it might have been 
expected that the aim would be to harmonise Australian and US copyright law.116 
Certainly Australian copyright law became more like US law. However, at the 
same time as features of US law were adopted, there was an observable, deliber-
ate process of distancing Australian from US approaches, with government 
emphasising repeatedly that it was not required to, would not, and did not adopt 
US models.117 Not for the first time, the approach seems to have been one of 
striving to do the absolute minimum necessary to implement the treaty obliga-
tions; not for the first time, confusion results.118 Minimum implementation is 
one legitimate goal of lawmaking in this area, but not one which should neces-
sarily be bought at the price of unreadable, unworkable law. 
A second observation which may be made about this history is that the process 
of reform was the subject of sustained and, in my view, legitimate criticism. It is 
not clear, in other words, that the shift from external, independent reviews to a 
very controlled, in-Department approach could be hailed a complete success. 
As a preliminary point, it must be recognised that some criticism was inevita-
ble, no matter how the law was drafted, and however the process was managed. 
The natural response of those unhappy with a substantive legislative outcome is 
to complain that they have not been heard. In copyright, someone will always be 
unhappy: there are many competing interests, and no-one can get everything they 
want,119 a fact acknowledged during the parliamentary debates on the Copyright 
Amendment Act 2006 (Cth).120 It must also be recognised that there were many 
 
116 According to DFAT, Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement: Intellectual Property (2007) 
Australian Government <http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/outcomes/08_intellectual 
_property.htm>, the AUSFTA ‘[h]armonises our intellectual property laws more closely with the 
largest intellectual property market in the world’. 
117 See above n 81 and accompanying text; see also House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, TPM Inquiry Report, above n 73, 19–20. 
118 Cf the government’s approach to implementing international obligations on performers’ rights: 
Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘“Pretendy-Rights”: On the Insanely Complicated New Regime for 
Performers’ Rights in Australia, and How Australian Performers Lost Out’ in Fiona Macmillan 
and Kathy Bowrey (eds), New Directions in Copyright Law (2006) vol 3, 171, 172. 
119 The increased ‘polarisation’ of all IP debates, including those over copyright, has often been 
noted: see, eg, Litman, ‘War and Peace’, above n 103, 4–5 (on the ‘copyright wars’); Robert P 
Merges, ‘One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000’ (2000) 88 
California Law Review 2187. For a brief discussion of the diverse interest group pressures 
operating in the copyright field: see Ricketson, ‘The Future of Australian Intellectual Property 
Law and Administration’, above n 8, 22. 
120 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 November 2006, 41 (Andrew Bartlett); 112, 
114 (Christopher Ellison, Minister for Justice and Customs); Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
 
     
988 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 31 
     
opportunities given for input into the process, and that after six or more reviews, 
at least five issues papers, days of parliamentary and parliamentary committee 
time, well over 300 submissions,121 and who knows how much departmental and 
ministerial staff time in meetings, a line had to be drawn somewhere.122 There 
are benefits, too, in having specialised, or focused, consultation and interest 
group participation in highly technical areas like copyright law;123 indeed, it is 
worth remembering that the Spicer Committee, whose recommendations led to 
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), explicitly commented that their decision not to 
hold public hearings had the advantage of ‘a freer and franker discussion of the 
issues’.124 Nor would it be reasonable to expect that the entire process will be 
conducted in public: there is such a thing as ‘too much’ transparency.125 In this 
particular case, the AUSFTA had turned copyright into a foreign policy issue and 
thus raised the stakes for reform. The US takes a very keen interest in how its 
bilateral trade agreements are translated, and this inevitably affected the degree 
of freedom Australia had to determine copyright policy, and importantly, the 
government’s ability to be transparent. 
It is also important to see the copyright reform process in its broader 
law-making context. I have already made reference to the fact that control of 
both Houses of Parliament enabled a truncated process: the government did not 
have to negotiate in order to have its laws passed. In addition, it has been noted 
elsewhere that Ministers in the Howard government took more direct control 
over policymaking, planning and implementation,126 and that there was a greater 
 
Debates, House of Representatives, 5 December 2006, 64 (Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General), 
65 (Nicola Roxon, Shadow Attorney-General). 
121 The TPM Inquiry received 64 submissions (see House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, TPM Inquiry Report, above n 73, 2); the Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs received 74 submissions (see Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, SSCLCA Final Report, above n 78, 55–8); and 
the Attorney-General’s Department received 161 submissions in the Fair Use Review: see Attor-
ney-General’s Department, Copyright — Review of Fair Use Exception — May 2005 (26 June 
2006) Australian Government <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Publications 
_Copyright-ReviewofFairUseExeption-May2005>. There were therefore at least 299 submis-
sions. I say over 300 because this total does not count submissions made to Phillips Fox, Digital 
Agenda Review, above n 24, and an unknown number of private submissions made to the Attor-
ney-General’s Department, referred to in the chronology of consultations in Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, SSCLCA Final Report, above n 78, 65. 
122 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 November 2006, 111 (Christopher Ellison, 
Minister for Justice and Customs). See also at 112 (Christopher Ellison, Minister for Justice and 
Customs), stating that ‘[m]ore consultations will not change [stakeholders’] views. There is no 
compromise that will make all stakeholders happy.’ 
123 Edward C Page, Governing by Numbers: Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy-Making 
(2001) 12. In copyright law, it might be argued that the ‘general public’ have little to add to the 
debate about the law. As should be clear, I do not subscribe to this argument. Copyright law can 
gain legitimacy only through informed public discussion: see below n 131 and accompanying 
text. If it is too complicated for the public to understand, it may be time to pare down copyright 
law to its core: see Samuelson, above n 10. 
124 CLRC, Parliament of Australia, Report to Consider What Alterations Are Desirable in the 
Copyright Law of the Commonwealth (1959) (‘Spicer Committee Report’) 7. 
125 See, eg, Jim Rossi, ‘Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative 
Agency Decisionmaking’ (1997) 92 Northwestern University Law Review 173. 
126 Paul Kelly, ‘How Howard Governs’ in Nick Cater (ed), The Howard Factor: A Decade That 
Changed the Nation (2006) 3, 7–8. 
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focus on private consultations with stakeholders,127 although commentators have 
pointed out that the trend in this direction was observable in earlier govern-
ments.128 In the 2003–06 copyright reform process, there was at least a relatively 
long lead-in time to the legislative amendments; in many cases, the govern-
ment’s general policy decisions, if not the details of the legislation, were released 
well in advance. This was not a situation in which legislation was passed and 
then sent for review;129 nor was it a situation where amendments were put so 
urgently that Parliament had to be recalled to pass them.130 
Even taking all these factors into account, however, there are legitimate 
grounds for criticising what happened. The process for law-making matters. As 
legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron has pointed out: 
procedures in politics are not just ceremonies or red tape or mindless bureau-
cratic hoops to jump through. They relate specifically to issues of legitimacy, 
particularly in circumstances where there is deep-seated disagreement as to 
what substantive principles should be observed.131 
In any highly contested area of policy, it is important that stakeholders receive 
equal treatment and have equal rights of participation in the law-making process. 
Copyright is an area rife with substantive disagreement,132 and yet one which 
depends on public legitimacy to be effective, because the effectiveness of 
copyright law depends to a large extent on voluntary observance by members of 
the public.133 This becomes harder to achieve when the media coverage of 
copyright law portrays it as a set of rules which makes iPod use infringement and 
criminalises kids. The government referred to the ensuing media attention as 
‘sensationalism’, but the negative coverage was at least exacerbated by the 
government’s own approach.134 The decision to depart from past, open public 
 
127 Paul Kelly, ‘Re-Thinking Australian Governance — The Howard Legacy’ (Paper presented at 
the Cunningham Lecture, The Academy of Social Sciences, Canberra, 2005). The Administrative 
Review Council (‘ARC’), too, in its review of administrative rule-making, has noted that while 
agencies do consult extensively, such consultations tend to be done informally, and are restricted 
to known sectional interests. The ARC has warned of the danger of ‘captured consultation’, 
where certain groups develop expectations about being consulted, while other viewpoints are 
excluded: see ARC, Rule-Making by Commonwealth Agencies, Report No 35 (1992) 31. 
128 See Kelly, ‘How Howard Governs’, above n 126. 
129 Cf the passage in 2005 of amendments to the law of sedition, followed by referral to the 
Australian Law Reform Commission, culminating in: Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia, Report No 104 (2006). 
130 Cf Andrew Lynch, ‘Legislating with Urgency — The Enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act [No 
1] 2005’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 747. 
131 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Principles of Legislation’ in Richard W Bauman and Tsvi Kahana (eds), The 
Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State (2006) 15, 18. 
Waldron goes on to point out that, for the citizen who disagrees with the substantive principles 
enacted in legislation, ‘one has to appeal to something about the way the law was enacted … so 
that he can see its enactment as fair even if he does not see its substance as just.’ For a similar 
point in a very different context: see ibid. In relation to copyright specifically: see Robert Burrell 
and Allison Coleman, Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (2005) 280–2. 
132 See above n 119. 
133 Jane C Ginsburg, ‘How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself’ (2002) 26 Columbia Journal of 
Law & the Arts 61; Jon M Garon, ‘Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copy-
right Philosophy and Ethics’ (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 1278, 1282. 
134 See, eg, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 November 2006, 114 (Christopher 
Ellison, Minister for Justice and Customs), commenting that ‘the government has noted some of 
the media and other commentary on the Bill, much of which, disappointingly, referred to ex-
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review processes to an almost completely ‘in-Department’ process, and to 
conduct selective, secretive consultations in relation to the criminal offences in 
particular, created an adversarial atmosphere and the impression that a form of 
‘consultation capture’ might be behind the less consumer-friendly aspects of the 
law.135 It also considerably reduced the ‘buy in’ of excluded groups in the 
outcomes.136 The late release of large slabs of complex statutory language meant 
that there were errors and unintended consequences, causing unnecessary panic, 
and providing easy targets for critics, who pointed to the ridiculous and draco-
nian applications of copyright law which could result. It is ironic that the impulse 
informing some of the reforms was to make the laws more ‘consumer-friendly’ 
by allowing personal copying, and to remove technical and out-of-date parts of 
the law which bring copyright laws into disrepute.137 Query whether the law is 
more, or less in disrepute now. 
One final observation may be made. The decision to use a series of differ-
ently-constituted parliamentary committees wasted time, led to the rehashing of 
debates, and negatively affected the rigour of the scrutiny applied to the laws. I 
can assert from personal experience that the various members of Parliament who 
sat on committees on copyright reform worked hard to understand the issues 
before them, but between the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (‘JSCOT’), 
Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the 
United States of America (‘SSCFTA’), the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs and its Senate counterpart, 40 
individual members of Parliament were required, in each case on truncated 
timetables, to become acquainted with highly technical matters of copyright 
law.138 It is enough to make one look back wistfully at Professor Sam Ricket-
son’s suggestion of a permanent Intellectual Property Law Reform Commis-
sion,139 or the recommendation of the Labor members of the SSCFTA for the 
formation of a Standing Committee on Intellectual Property. 
IV  BUREAUCRATISING COPYRIGHT 
The process described in the preceding two Parts generated outcomes that 
display certain common features. As I noted in Part I above, it is not my intention 
to engage with all the substantive policy choices embodied in the various 
 
treme and inaccurate scenarios rather than assessing the practical effect of these reforms … this 
undermines public confidence in copyright.’ A better way to put it, perhaps, is that the panic and 
the news stories tended to lead to copyright law ‘los[ing] the moral high ground’: see Litman, 
‘War and Peace’, above n 103, 9. It should be noted, however, that the reactions were not con-
fined to the ‘sensationalist’: see, eg, Allan Fels and Fred Brenchley, ‘Out of Tune with Reality’, 
The Australian Financial Review (Melbourne), 28 November 2006. 
135 On ‘consultation capture’: see ARC, above n 127. 
136 Burrell and Coleman, above n 131, 281. 
137 See above n 72 and accompanying text. 
138 Only three people sat on more than one of these committees: Senators George Brandis 
(SSCFTA, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs), Andrew Bartlett 
(JSCOT, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs) and Linda Kirk 
(JSCOT, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs). 
139 Ricketson, ‘The Future of Australian Intellectual Property Law and Administration’, above n 8, 
27–9; SSCFTA, SSCFTA Report, above n 54, 230 recommendation 6. 
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reforms: this is not an article about whether or not we should have a parody and 
satire defence, nor whether the laws result in ‘digital lock-up’ of copyright 
material.140 Instead, I want to focus on the impact of reform on the copyright 
‘system’: the network of institutions and agencies — public and quasi-public — 
which manage copyright rights and the relations between copyright owners and 
users. My contention, fleshed out in detail in this Part, is that the recent reforms 
affected the operation of, and relations between, these institutions and agencies: 
more specifically, where it had a choice, the government in the period 2004–06 
more often adopted rules with features which could be described as bureaucratic. 
Two such features in particular are:141 
1 the adoption of legislative features and tools more often seen in regulatory 
regimes, including highly specified rules or guidelines, either in legislation 
or encouraged by it, which can be applied in effect automatically;142 and 
2 the allocation of decision-making power to expert officials, in the form of 
new or extended roles for various parts of the executive branch of govern-
ment. 
Both the development of rigid and highly specified, objective rules, and the 
growth in the importance (and size) of the administrative apparatus tasked with 
the ongoing management of regulation,143 are characteristics of the phenomena 
known as ‘bureaucratisation’. 
One example from the recent reforms may serve to illustrate this process as it 
applies to copyright law. A new ISP safe harbour regime was introduced in 2004 
as a result of the AUSFTA to provide a means for carriage service providers 
(‘CSPs’) to insulate themselves against potential liability for copyright infringe-
 
140 Others have already begun this task: see Sally McCausland, ‘Protecting “A Fine Tradition of 
Satire”: The New Fair Dealing Exception for Parody or Satire in the Australian Copyright Act’ 
(2007) 29 European Intellectual Property Review 287; Dale Clapperton and Stephen Corones, 
‘Locking in Customers, Locking out Competitors: Anti-Circumvention Laws in Australia and 
Their Potential Effect on Competition in High Technology Markets’ (2006) 30 Melbourne Uni-
versity Law Review 657; Maree Sainsbury, ‘Parody, Satire, Honour and Reputation: The Inter-
play between Economic and Moral Rights’ (2007) 18 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 
149. 
141 Similar trends have been observed in the US in relation to what Liu describes as ‘regulatory’ 
copyright: see Liu, above n 10, 102–5. There are differences, however. In the US there is no 
equivalent to the Attorney-General’s Department. The closest equivalent, the Copyright Office, 
headed by the Register of Copyrights, is not part of a government department, but operates 
within the Library of Congress, which is actually part of the legislative branch of government, 
and hence somewhat independent from the executive. The Copyright Office provides advice to 
Congress on the development of copyright policy, and advises relevant government departments 
including the US Department of Commerce, the Department of State, and the Office of the US 
Trade Representative. It also operates the US Copyright Register, and administers Copyright 
Arbitration Royalty Panels. 
142 Max Weber, Economy and Society (1968) 958; Owen M Fiss, ‘The Bureaucratization of the 
Judiciary’ (1983) 92 Yale Law Journal 1442, 1450. 
143 One classic definition of a ‘bureaucracy’ is a complex organisation with three features: (1) a 
multitude of actors; (2) a division of functions or responsibilities among them; and (3) a reliance 
upon a hierarchy as the central coordination device: see Fiss, above n 142, 1444. Max Weber, in 
his early sociological work on bureaucracy, emphasises the growth of a set of specialised, quali-
fied persons assigned full-time to duties delimited by rules and managed through hierarchical 
relationships: see Weber, above n 142, 956–8. In the copyright context: see Streeter, above n 10, 
570–2. 
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ment occurring over their networks.144 This regime supplemented the existing 
law of authorisation, with all its uncertainty and case-by-case assessment,145 
adding a set of well-defined, certain rules accommodated in a system requiring 
no real thought once established.146 In addition, the division involves a not 
insignificant amount of delegation to the executive branch: a considerable 
number of matters may be prescribed by regulation, including the procedure for 
removing allegedly infringing material, any system for counternotices, and 
causes of action and remedies which may be brought for misuse of the safe 
harbour system.147 Responsibility for maintenance of the system thus shifts to 
the Attorney-General’s Department. 
The bureaucratic tendency in copyright is not, I hasten to add, a new phe-
nomenon: as with other legal regimes for recognising proprietary interests in 
intangibles, copyright has long been accompanied by the establishment of 
various public and quasi-public institutions for managing rights. The earliest 
copyright regimes involved the executive directly in the grant of rights by 
requiring registration,148 and although the compulsory register was abolished 
internationally by the Berlin revision of the Berne Convention on the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works in 1908,149 the abolition of compulsory formalities 
has shifted, not reduced copyright administration. Since 1926, Australian 
copyright owners have been establishing their own societies for the collective 
management of rights.150 Further, while there was some early reticence on the 
part of the Australian government to engage in oversight of the management of 
copyright, it has long since become accepted as appropriate: the Australian 
Copyright Tribunal was established in 1968 to deal with disputes over compul-
 
144 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt V div 2AA. 
145 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1A), 101(1A). The fact-specific nature of the assessment is 
demonstrated in the recent Full Court of the Federal Court decision in Cooper v Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 156 FCR 380. CSPs may choose whether to rely on the law of authori-
sation, or the safe harbours in Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt V div 2AA. 
146 I acknowledge of course that under the safe harbours, CSPs may choose not to remove material 
they do not consider infringing. The regime however encourages them to act reflexively and 
automatically: any risk arising from non-removal lies on the CSP. 
147 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AJ; Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) pt 3A. 
148 Under the Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Anne, c 19, rights extended only to books entered into ‘the 
Register-Book of the Company of Stationers’. 
149 Since the revision of the International Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works in 1908 in Berlin, copyright protection may not be made conditional on the existence of 
formalities: see International Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
opened for signature 13 November 1908, [1912] ATS 9, art 4 (entered into force 9 September 
1910); see also Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for 
signature 24 July 1971, 1161 UNTS 3, art 5(2) (entered into force 1 March 1978) (‘Berne Con-
vention’). Australia maintained a register until 1968. This was despite its abolition in the UK 
which provided the model for most of the original Copyright Act 1912 (Cth): see Robert Burrell, 
‘Copyright Reform in the Early Twentieth Century: The View from Australia’ (2006) 27 Journal 
of Legal History 239, 257. Under s 26 of the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth), registration was op-
tional, but certain ‘special remedies’ were available only to registered owners. The Australian 
register was abolished with the proclamation of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
150 The first collecting society in Australia was the Australasian Performing Right Association 
(‘APRA’), incorporated in 1926. For more historical background: see Simpson, above n 8, ch 3. 
Collecting societies are ‘bureaucratic’ in a very classical sense as described in the sources cited 
in above n 143: they are complex, rule-bound organisations, which collect money almost like a 
tax on users and distribute it according to predetermined rules: see Streeter, above n 10, 576; 
Kretschmer, above n 10, 133–5. 
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sory and collective licences.151 Moreover, from very early on, the Australian 
government has intervened in the market for copyright material by legislating for 
compulsory licences that limit copyright owners, in some cases, to receiving 
only collectively administered remuneration;152 such systems inevitably involve 
both detailed rules which simulate, rather than create, a market, and the delega-
tion of regulatory power to administrative agencies. Indeed, if we were awarding 
the prize for ‘most bureaucratic aspects of copyright law’, the leading candidate 
would be the educational statutory licences, which were introduced in the 
1980s:153 they represent a bureaucratic simulation of a market,154 complete with 
detailed specifications regarding what educational institutions may copy, which 
operate mechanically within user institutions, require systems for monitoring 
use, establish ministerial power to decide who negotiates on behalf of copyright 
owners,155 and institute a public authority — the Copyright Tribunal — to set the 
price for these activities.156 
Nor is the adoption of highly bureaucratic features unique to copyright law. As 
numerous commentators have pointed out, ‘the history of the twentieth century is 
largely the history of increasing bureaucratization’.157 In recent times in Austra-
lia, we have seen similar phenomena to those described here lamented at length 
in industrial relations; in corporate law too, commentators have been asking 
‘where did the law go?’ as powers to make increasingly elaborate rules have 
been delegated to the executive branch of government.158 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that this feature of the recent reforms is not 
solely the initiative of the Australian government. I am sure that neither the 
Attorney-General nor his Department sat down and thought to themselves: how 
can we take over more control of copyright? There are no doubt many driving 
 
151 After APRA was established in Australia in 1926, it did not take long before there were calls to 
control this ‘monopolistic’ body: see Commonwealth, Royal Commission on Performing Rights, 
Final Report (1933) (‘Owen Commission’). The Owen Commission concluded that a tribunal 
should be established to counterbalance APRA’s monopolistic power. In 1943, the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Broadcasting similarly recommended compulsory arbitration for dis-
putes between APRA, the Australian Broadcasting Commission, and the Federation of Commer-
cial Broadcasting Stations: CLRC, Spicer Committee Report, above n 124, 66. 
152 As early as 1911, there was a compulsory licence for reproduction of published works for sale 
25 years from the death of the author, without consent but with a fixed royalty: Copyright Act 
1911, 1 & 2 Geo 5, c 46, ss 3−4, incorporated into Australian law by Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) 
s 8. There was also a compulsory licence for the making of records of musical works previously 
recorded: Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) s 19(2). 
153 Part VA (an educational statutory licence for the recording of off-air broadcasts) and pt VB (an 
educational statutory licence for reproducing and communicating works) of the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) were inserted into the Act in 1989: see Copyright Amendment Act 1989 (Cth) 
ss 14–15. Educational institutions had long insisted that much of their copying fell under the free 
licence for research and study. This argument was rejected in Haines v Copyright Agency Ltd 
(1982) 64 FLR 182. 
154 Streeter, above n 10, 588–90 (discussing the ‘bureaucratic simulation’ of the market inherent in 
parts of US copyright law). 
155 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 135P, 135ZZB. 
156 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 135H, 135J, 135JA, 135ZU, 135ZV, 135ZW. 
157 Fiss, above n 142, 1442. 
158 Stephen Bottomley, ‘Where Did the Law Go? The Delegation of Australian Corporate 
Regulation’ (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1. More generally, the tendency 
towards more complex bureaucracies has been noted by commentators going back to Max We-
ber himself: see Weber, above n 142, 971. 
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forces behind the adoption of these features in copyright reform. Some aspects of 
the new regime were dictated by the AUSFTA: unfortunately, we inherited from 
the US some additional copyright bureaucracy — the safe harbours being one 
such part.159 Still other parts are an attempt by the government to draw a line 
somewhere in between the competing claims of stakeholders, or a response to the 
demands of (institutional) stakeholders for certainty,160 or assistance in ongoing 
disputes.161 In the last Part, I noted that the reform process favoured established 
copyright stakeholders, most of which are themselves bureaucratically organised 
entities. Detailed, certain rules may well suit, and thus be sought by, copyright 
collecting societies and the large institutional copyright users such as educational 
institutions, libraries, galleries and archives. In addition, regulatory details, once 
in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), are very difficult to remove.162 It is possible, 
too, that some decisions to delegate power to the Attorney-General’s Department 
or other parts of the executive arose from sheer pragmatism: the drafters recog-
nised that it might be important to build ongoing powers of adjustment into the 
legislation. Since copyright is both relatively arcane and technical it is hard to 
get copyright on the legislative agenda; and because it has contentious interest 
groups, it is hard to get through Parliament. Proposals for copyright reform can 
wait for years to be enacted.163 It is thus safer to ensure that adjustments can be 
made without having to resort to legislation. 
Thus in identifying this bureaucratic tendency I am arguing neither conspiracy, 
nor a new or unique phenomenon. Nevertheless, whatever the driving forces, we 
need to be aware of this tendency, and we need to think about its consequences. 
As I will argue below, these features of the reforms should also prompt an 
assessment of how well our copyright system, in all its intricacies, is performing. 
But first I must justify my assertion, by identifying and describing these fea-
tures, leaving space for a future assessment in historical context. I have given 
one example already — the ISP safe harbours — but it is the least interesting 
case, precisely because, in being adopted wholesale from the US, it is the area 
where the Australian government had the least choice about the degree of 
 
159 In addition, as noted above, several of the changes to the exceptions were justified by the 
government as necessary to ensure the compliance of Australian law with the three-step test 
contained in art 9(2) of the Berne Convention, opened for signature 24 July 1971, 1161 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 1 March 1978); TRIPS, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3, 
annex 1C, art 13 (entered into force 1 January 1995). The claim is at least questionable: see 
further below Part IV(A). 
160 The Attorney-General has pointed this out a number of times: see above n 72. 
161 Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) sch 7. 
162 Consider, for example, the detailed provisions on record keeping under the statutory licences: 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 135K, 135L, 135ZQ(3)–(4), 135ZX, 135ZY. The CLRC, in its draft 
report on the Copyright Tribunal, recommended removal of these provisions subject to a power 
in the Tribunal to make determinations. It received protests from both collecting societies and 
the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee: above n 63, 5. The original version of the Copy-
right Amendment Bill followed the CLRC recommendation: see, eg, Explanatory Memorandum, 
Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) 188. Again, protests, and again, backdown: Supplemen-
tary Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) 29. 
163 While the immediate period just passed experienced many copyright reforms, such a degree of 
parliamentary attention to the subject is very unusual. As I noted above, in recent times we had 
the interesting conjunction of political awareness, a deadline for reform, and a theme: see above 
Part II(B). 
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bureaucratisation to introduce. I want to focus instead on less obvious areas: the 
exceptions, the enforcement, and the anti-circumvention laws. It is the adoption 
of bureaucratic approaches in these contexts which is more striking — in the first 
two because they were areas of home-grown reform in which a considerable 
range of choice was available; in the last, because it represented the third, 
controversial area of reform and one where the Australian government differenti-
ated its approach from that of the US despite a detailed AUSFTA. In each of these 
three key areas, I will seek to identify the policy issue sought to be addressed, 
the option chosen to address it, the effect of the option chosen on the copyright 
system, and any alternatives, before turning, in the final Part of this article, to 
the implications of the phenomenon described here. 
A  The New Copyright Exceptions 
My first example relates to copyright exceptions, chosen in part because this 
part of the copyright reforms attracted the most attention in 2006. Here the 
government sought to resolve the glaring inconsistency between what consumers 
were doing in the real world (taping television and using iPods), and what 
copyright law said they should be doing (neither of the above),164 by introducing 
a series of private copying exceptions designed to legalise common consumer 
activities involving copying of legitimately purchased material.165 Following the 
passage of the reforms, a person can make: 
• one copy ‘in a different form’ of a work contained in a book, newspaper, or 
periodical publication;166 
• one copy of a photograph (from paper to electronic, or vice versa, but not 
from paper to paper, or electronic to electronic);167 
• any number of copies of a sound recording in any format;168 
• one copy in electronic form of a film on video tape;169 and 
• ‘time-shift’ copies of broadcast for perusal at a more convenient time.170 
 
164 There was no exception for private copying in Australian law. On the issue of private copying in 
the review: see Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘A Comment on the Copyright Exceptions Review and 
Private Copying’ (Working Paper No 14, IPRIA, The University of Melbourne, 2005). 
165 Ruddock, ‘Fair Use and Copyright in Australia’, above n 72, 6. 
166 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 43C. It is not clear what ‘a different form’ means; there is no 
explanation in Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth). For one 
example: see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 November 
2006, 36 (Paul Neville). 
167 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47J. 
168 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 109A. The exposure draft was narrower, allowing only a single copy 
of a sound recording in any given format. This, however, was inconsistent with the actual opera-
tion of devices which require copies on both a computer and the device. The exception was 
therefore amended: see Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 
2006 (Cth) 8. 
169 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 110AA. 
170 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 111. This exception was specifically limited to radio and television 
content delivered via traditional broadcasting methods, not new methods such as the internet: 
see Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) 6–7; 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 111(1), 10(1); Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) s 6(1). 
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This brief summary overstates consumer freedoms: there are other limitations, 
including, inter alia, a requirement that the consumer not sell or pass on their 
originals to another person.171 The exceptions are particularly noteworthy for 
their specificity: for example, the differential treatment of sound recordings, 
where any number of copies can be made in any format,172 and films and literary 
works, where only one copy is allowed, for all time — woe betide you if your 
e-book reader uses iPod-like software which requires the keeping of two copies! 
In the case of films, only one particular kind of transformation is allowed; 
presumably, following any shift from DVDs to another format, we will need to 
revisit whether a new exception is required for shifting collections.173 The 
drafters looked at existing technology and current practice, and narrowly wrote 
the exceptions to fit. The private copying exceptions were not alone in display-
ing this tendency: other exceptions are similarly tied to the operation of technol-
ogy and the day-to-day practice of their beneficiaries. For example, three new 
provisions allow key cultural institutions to make preservation copies of works 
of ‘historical and cultural significance to Australia’ in their collections174 but, 
like the private copying exceptions, the preservation copying provisions provide 
for differential treatment of different subject matters,175 and are highly specific: 
three preservation copies are allowed, but make four copies, in accordance with 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(‘UNESCO’) recommended standards, and you may no longer have protec-
tion.176 
Readers familiar with the 2006 reforms may by this point be thinking to them-
selves: ‘Ah, some of the new exceptions may be specific, but in other areas the 
legislation introduced flexibility into the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)’. Two of the 
 
171 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 43C(3), (6), 47J(3), (6), 109A(3). In the case of sound recordings, 
the source of the recording is also determinative: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 109A(1)(c). 
172 Subject to some additional requirements, in particular, the person must own both the sound 
recording they copy and the device onto which it is copied: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
ss 109A(1)(a), (b). On the Attorney-General’s Department’s view of the need to limit the excep-
tion: see SSCLCA Final Report, above n 78, 23. 
173 The government undertook to consider in two years’ time whether the format-shifting exception 
for audio-visual works should be extended beyond the ancient videotape: Attorney-General’s 
Department, ‘Fair Use Review’, above n 70, 6. 
174 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 51B, 110BA (sound recordings and films), 112AA (published 
editions). Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) [6.104]–[6.105]. 
175 The provisions distinguish between works held in manuscript, unpublished, or first record form 
(preservation copies allowed) or published form (preservation copies allowed where not avail-
able ‘within a reasonable time at an ordinary commercial price’). For original artistic works, the 
provision allows ‘up to three comprehensive photographic reproductions’. 
176 Three copies is said to be the number required by ‘international best practice guidelines for 
preservation’: Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 
(Cth) [76]. The original draft allowed one copy. See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary De-
bates, Senate, 29 November 2006, 37 (Joseph Ludwig), noting that the UNESCO standard is 
four copies, and that ‘splitting the difference … does not make sense’. The government response 
was that additional copies might be allowed under s 200AB: Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, Senate, 29 November 2006, 115 (Christopher Ellison, Minister for Justice and Cus-
toms). This seems inconsistent with ordinary canons of statutory interpretation. The government 
is also dictatorial regarding what uses may be made of the copies. They may only be made for 
‘the purpose of preserving the work against loss or deterioration’, meaning that they may not be 
‘made available to patrons, nor may they be used for copying to fulfil requests from other librar-
ies or archives’: Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 
(Cth) [75]. 
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new exceptions might be seen in this light: the parody and satire exception, 
which is written as a fair dealing exception,177 and s 200AB, which allows parts 
of the non-commercial sector (that is, libraries and archives, educational institu-
tions, and institutions or volunteers that assist people with a disability)178 to 
make certain non-commercial uses. It is true that the parody and satire defence 
‘bucks the trend’: it is drafted in a relatively flexible, open-textured way.179 At 
first glance, s 200AB also seems to provide flexibility. Under s 200AB, libraries 
and archives may make copies ‘for the purpose of maintaining or operating the 
library or archives’ or ‘to provide services of a kind usually provided by a library 
or archive’, and educational institutions may use copyright material ‘for the 
purpose of giving educational instruction’. According to the legislative history, 
the exception was introduced to provide ‘flexibility’ for public institutions to 
perform ‘socially useful’ acts.180 As such it would appear counter to the prolif-
eration of rigid, objective rules which I have described. 
But is s 200AB truly flexible? The exception is limited by the entity involved 
(only certain public sector institutions are included) and the purpose of the use 
(only certain conduct for certain purposes by those bodies is permitted).181 
Furthermore, it applies only where a statutory licence does not apply,182 and is 
subject to the Berne Convention183 three-step test — that is, the use must 
constitute a special case, must not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work, nor unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner of 
copyright.184 Given all these limitations, one educational industry adviser at the 
Australian Centre for Intellectual Property in Agriculture’s Copyright Confer-
ence in February 2007 referred to the exception as the nine-step test.185 Remem-
 
177 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 41A, 103AA. 
178 While s 200AB of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) does not specify ‘institutions or volunteers’, the 
banning of a commercial purpose or profit has essentially that effect. 
179 It is thus particularly interesting to note that the parody and satire defence was originally 
included in the arguably much less flexible Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 200AB, and only after 
protest from users was it redrafted as a fair dealing defence. The Exposure Draft was discussed 
in Patricia Loughlan, ‘Parody, Copyright and the New Four-Step Test’ (2006) 67 Intellectual 
Property Forum 46. See also McCausland, above n 140, 290. 
180 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) 12; Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 October 2006, 2 (Philip Ruddock, Attor-
ney-General). The Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to the Copyright Amendment Bill 
2006 (Cth) even uses the heading ‘Fair Use’ in relation to s 200AB: Supplementary Explanatory 
Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) [46]–[62]. 
181 Albeit the categories used are drawn broadly. More specifically, libraries and archives may use 
the exception for copying ‘made for the purpose of maintaining or operating the library or ar-
chives’ or ‘to provide services of a kind usually provided by a library or archives’: Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) s 200AB(2)(b). Educational institutions may copy ‘for the purpose of giving educa-
tional instruction’: at s 200AB(3)(b). However, whether this is different from copies made for 
‘educational purposes’ (the terminology of the statutory licences) is not entirely clear; and 
not-for-profit copying may be made by or for ‘a person with a disability that causes difficulty in 
reading, viewing, or hearing the work … in a particular form’ for the purpose of ‘obtaining a … 
copy … in another form, or with a feature, that reduces the difficulty’ : at s 200AB(4)(b). 
182 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 200AB(6). 
183 Opened for signature 24 July 1971, 1161 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 March 1978). 
184 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 200AB(1)(a), (c), (d), (7). For treaty sources of the three-step test: 
see above n 159. 
185 Carolyn Dalton, ‘Educating the Educators: Implementing the 2006 Copyright Amendments’ 
(Speech delivered at the Australian Centre for Intellectual Property in Agriculture 12th Annual 
Copyright Conference, Brisbane, 16 February 2007). 
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ber, too, the nature of the entities to whom this ‘flexibility’ was granted: for the 
most part, highly bureaucratic, and risk averse, institutional entities.186 It can 
scarcely be expected that individual teachers and librarians are going to be sitting 
down and working out whether s 200AB applies to their particular situation. In 
my view, the entities allowed to use the exceptions have two likely choices: they 
may treat the provision as a dead letter or defence of last resort to be called on in 
a legal challenge, or alternatively as something to be ‘tamed’ through more 
certain, objective rules, perhaps in the form of industry guidelines. If guidelines 
are chosen, it might be expected that there would be some negotiation with the 
relevant collecting society, the Copyright Agency Limited (‘CAL’), as the entity 
most affected by the guidelines and most likely to bring a challenge in court to 
any guidelines issued.187 In summary, then, s 200AB scarcely detracts from the 
overall tendency of the reforms to ‘bureaucratise’ copyright exceptions. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the government also took the opportunity 
in 2006 to cast a regulatory eye over the rest of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 
amending existing exceptions in ways that reduced their flexibility and the 
autonomy of their beneficiaries. For example, prior to the recent changes, 
libraries and archives were entitled to make copies of material held in their 
collection for ‘administrative purposes’,188 a term which was then undefined.189 
The Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) retained the exception but introduced 
a new definition of the term in order to ‘ensure that copying is appropriately 
limited under this section to only genuinely administrative purposes, being those 
directly related to the effective internal management, care and control of the 
collection of the library or archives.’190 Apparently, libraries and archives cannot 
be trusted to exercise their own judgement as to what constitutes ‘administrative 
purposes’. Another example is an amendment made to the statutory licence under 
which educational institutions are entitled to make copies of material for their 
students. Under the statutory licence, such institutions have always been able to 
make free copies of up to two pages or one per cent of the number of pages of a 
work, on the basis that this constituted an ‘insubstantial portion’.191 The Copy-
right Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) extended this exception to the 
digital environment, but the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) has narrowed 
the digital version of this accommodation by providing, in essence, that the 
passages copied making up the portion less than two pages or one per cent must 
 
186 As to the risk averse nature of the institutions involved: see Emily Hudson and Andrew Kenyon, 
‘Digital Access: The Impact of Copyright on Digitisation Practices in Australian Museums, 
Galleries, Libraries and Archives’ (2007) 30 University of New South Wales Law Journal 12. 
187 CAL has previously sued over guidelines: Haines v Copyright Agency Ltd (1982) 64 FLR 182. 
188 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 51A(2). 
189 For the use of this provision and its importance to the running of libraries and archives: see 
Hudson and Kenyon, above n 186. 
190 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 51A(6); Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 
2006 (Cth) [6.102]. 
191 This explanation of the provision was tendered by the Attorney-General’s Department and 
DCITA: Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, 
Advisory Report on the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 (1999) [3.37] (‘An-
drews Committee Report’). It is consistent with the general position under copyright law that a 
copyright owner is only entitled to prevent, or demand payment for, the copying of a ‘substantial 
part’. 
     
2007] Of Copyright Bureaucracies and Incoherence 999 
     
be ‘continuous’ — if extracts from different parts of a work are used, the second 
and subsequent extracts will have to be paid for.192 This surely falls in the 
category of an amendment showing there is ‘no issue too small for the govern-
ment to dictate’.193 
Thus, subject perhaps to the parody provision, in the area of copyright excep-
tions, the 2006 reforms display a key bureaucratising tendency: the proliferation 
of detailed and rigid rules which may be applied objectively and without 
judgement. They also display the other tendency: the delegation of ongoing 
powers to parts of the executive arm of government. The various exceptions 
introduced, or modified, in this period are designed in such a way that they 
formalise relations between copyright owners and users: the exceptions appear to 
have been written, in many cases, by the drafters looking at current practice in 
the market, and embodying that practice in the form of highly specified rules. 
There is also an expanded role for the executive branch in a series of ways 
which, while minor taken individually, are striking when tallied up. By introduc-
ing such technology-specific rules, the government is practically required to 
keep matters under ongoing review. If the market or technology changes (if 
e-book readers requiring the storage of two copies hit the market, for example) 
there will be reason to go back and reconsider these issues.194 By being respon-
sive to stakeholder demands for more and more detail in some of the exceptions, 
for example, in the statutory licences, the government has more or less ensured it 
will continue to be the object of more rent-seeking.195 Finally, in the case of 
preservation copying the government explicitly reserved to itself the power to 
decide which cultural institutions in Australia have items of such ‘historical and 
cultural significance to Australia’ that they should be allowed a special preserva-
tion copying exception.196 
 
192 See Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) sch 8 pt 3. 
193 This change has the potential to be significant as schools receive a 25 per cent discount in 
copyright fees for insubstantial copying: see Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006, 30 
October 2006, Submission No 25, 7 (Copyright Advisory Group to the Schools Resourcing 
Taskforce of the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs). 
No similar change was made to the non-digital exception: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ZG; cf 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ZMB. The reason for the amendment appears to be complaints 
about ‘cherry-picking’ from organisations like CAL: see Submission to Senate Standing Com-
mittee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Copyright Amend-
ment Bill 2006, 30 October 2006, Submission No 29, 17 (CAL); see also Andrews Committee 
Report, above n 191, [3.32]–[3.42]. While the provision does not confer any discretion on the 
executive, its enactment does suggest to stakeholders that if they complain long enough, they 
may get the changes they want. This indirectly ensures that the executive will continue to be a 
focal point for lobbying. 
194 Of course, reconsideration would require legislative change — unilateral power to act has not 
been conferred on the executive. The role of the executive, however, does extend to the power to 
initiate the review, and bring forward any proposed new changes. 
195 It would also be fanciful to assume that, if guidelines are drafted in relation to Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) s 200AB, the government would not be involved in some way, given that the relevant 
institutions receive significant public funding. One would think, for example, that the Depart-
ment of Education, Science and Training would be involved in some way, as would, of course, 
the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs. 
196 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 51B(1). This was a late amendment to the Bill, designed to allow 
scope ‘to consider the merits of claims of institutions other than those who have a statutory 
function of preserving a collection, but who nonetheless develop and maintain collections that 
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This tendency towards the bureaucratic in the exceptions would be unremark-
able if it were unavoidable, but it was not: there were other approaches the 
government could have adopted. Take, for example, the personal copying 
exceptions. Having made the policy decision to excuse ordinary, legitimate 
consumer behaviour, there was a spectrum of approaches the government could 
have taken, ranging from the general to the specific, from an open-ended 
US-style ‘fair use’ exception197 through to the other extreme of a series of 
exceptions specifying the subject matter, number of copies, and technology of 
copying. There is also a middle ground: for example, exceptions which, while 
specific as to purpose, are more open-textured in the language and conditions 
they impose. Drafters of copyright law have long been aware of a range of 
options: existing Australian law exceptions display different degrees of specific-
ity. To generalise somewhat, previously existing exceptions for individual use — 
for example, the fair dealing exceptions, which allow use for a particular purpose 
provided it is fair — are more general in their terminology. There are other 
exceptions which are much more specific, but these are, in general, aimed at 
institutional users: for example, the libraries and archives exceptions which 
delimit the purpose, extent, and format of copying.198 For its new personal 
copying exceptions, the government chose the extreme specific end of this 
spectrum. This was a choice: even if it was not in favour of adopting a fully 
open-ended exception — a view that has some justification199 — it could, as an 
alternative, have alighted somewhere in the middle ground. For example, the 
government could arguably have drafted a single exception for ‘fair copying for 
the purposes of private and domestic use of legitimately purchased material’. 
Such an exception would potentially be both narrower and broader than the ones 
adopted,200 but would also be less technology-bound and more adaptable to 
changing market conditions. If it were not prepared to go so far, the infinitely 
 
are of historical and cultural significance to Australia’: Supplementary Explanatory Memoran-
dum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) [73]. This is perhaps an example of a provision 
conferring power on the executive on the pragmatic grounds that further legislation in the area 
could take years. 
197 17 USC §107 (2000 & Supp V, 2006). For a discussion: see Weatherall, ‘A Comment on the 
Copyright Exceptions Review and Private Copying’ above n 164; see also Attorney-General’s 
Department, ‘Fair Use Review’, above n 70. 
198 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 48–53, 104A, 104B, 110A, 110B. There are good reasons for the 
specificity of the library and archives exceptions: designed for bureaucratic institutions, they 
provide rules capable of objective application, and require the establishment of systems and the 
keeping of records. For a discussion of open-textured, as opposed to open-ended exceptions: see 
Burrell and Coleman, above n 131, 276–310; Robert Burrell, ‘Reining in Copyright Law: Is Fair 
Use the Answer?’ [2001] Intellectual Property Quarterly 361. 
199 There is a respectable, although by no means universally held, opinion that the open-ended fair 
use exception contravenes the Berne Convention three-step test even in the US: see Ruth 
Okediji, ‘Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine’ (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of Transna-
tional Law 75. There is an equally respectable view that the fair use exception in the US may not 
contravene the three-step test, because the case law provides sufficient ‘certainty’ and specific-
ity, but that the attempt to introduce a similar exception now in another country, without its 
elaboration in case law, would contravene the three-step test: see Burrell and Coleman, 
above n 131, 249–74. 
200 Given markets for digital downloads, it is possible that some copying of sound recordings is not 
‘fair’; but it is also possible that copying beyond the subject matters specified would be allowed 
under a fair private use exception. 
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more sensible exception relating to sound recordings could perhaps have been a 
model for these provisions. 
It might be objected that, particularly in the case of private copying, all of 
these options were not equally available, given existing international law. Any 
exceptions enacted by Australia must comply with the requirement known as the 
‘three-step test’, found in both the Berne Convention201 and TRIPS.202 Under that 
test, exceptions must be restricted to ‘certain special cases’, must not ‘conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work’, nor ‘unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the right holder’.203 One argument is that in order to 
comply with this requirement in the case of private and domestic copying — an 
exception justified by convenience rather than some overwhelming social benefit 
or public interest — any exception had to be limited so as to apply only in those 
cases of old technology, and only where it was clear that such use was already 
tolerated by copyright owners, since only this approach would minimise the 
interference with the interests and digital markets of copyright owners. To accept 
this argument is a cop-out.204 First, the three-step test is itself open-textured, and 
has historically been interpreted by states as giving them considerable flexibility; 
its developing content is uncertain at best.205 Secondly, there are other ways to 
address the concern that the exception must be limited; for example, by giving 
directions as to what kinds of copying should be considered legitimate, either in 
legislation or in the legislative history, or by listing factors to be considered in 
assessing what counts as ‘fair’ copying for private and domestic purposes.206 To 
the extent that specific limitations were considered necessary, they could have 
been included as conditions or situations of deemed or presumed unfairness.207 
In short, it is simply not true to assert that maximum specificity of the kind 
found in the new private and domestic copying exceptions was necessary as a 
matter of compliance with international obligations. The degree of specificity to 
which Australian copyright exceptions now descend has no international equal. 
If that degree of ‘certainty’ is required by international law, then Australia alone 
is complying. 
 
201 Opened for signature 24 July 1971, 1161 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 March 1978). 
202 Ibid art 9(2); TRIPS, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3, annex 1C, art 13 
(entered into force 1 January 1995). 
203 Above nn 201–2. 
204 It is also, by the by, arguably inconsistent with the approach adopted by the government in 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 200AB. 
205 Burrell and Coleman, above n 131, 217; Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, International 
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond (2005) vol 1, 763 
(noting the ambiguity over the meaning of the test). 
206 In a different context, Professor Ricketson has argued that ‘factor-based’ tests are consistent with 
the Berne Convention three-step test for exceptions: Sam Ricketson, The Three-Step Test, 
Deemed Quantities, Libraries and Closed Exceptions (2002) 64–7. Note that in the report Rick-
etson was considering a research and study exception; he has not considered specifically 
whether a personal copying exception, delimited by fairness determined according to a list of 
factors, could ever be consistent with art 9(2) of the Berne Convention and art 13 of TRIPS. The 
reasoning in the report does, however, suggest that a fairness test, along with a list of relevant 
factors, may provide sufficient certainty, the need for which appears to be the justification for 
the narrow drafting of the personal copying exceptions. 
207 Additional non-negotiable conditions on fair dealing exceptions are not unheard of: see, eg, the 
requirements of ‘sufficient acknowledgment’ in the exception for criticism or review under s 41 
of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
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It might further be objected that maximum specificity was also a response to 
stakeholder pressure for ‘certainty’.208 That may well be the case, although it 
should be noted in passing that not all stakeholders requested or favoured quite 
so much certainty: I suspect that such demands will have come most strongly 
from institutions which are structured, and operate, in a highly bureaucratic way 
themselves, because for them objective rules are the easiest to cope with.209 As 
noted in Part III(A) above, it is not my contention that the government set out to 
grab extraordinary power over copyright, nor that it wanted to ‘grow’ the 
copyright bureaucracy. There may well be multiple drivers for the choices made, 
and in this case, both concerns about compliance with international law and 
demands for certainty played a role. The point, for present purposes, is that 
choices of this kind are being made, and repeatedly. 
B  The Criminal Provisions 
My second example of the kinds of bureaucratic choices made in recent times 
is another high profile area of copyright reform from 2006: the criminal offence 
provisions. The policy issue which the government wished to solve here was the 
gap between the letter of the law and its enforcement. In short, copyright 
infringement is hard to detect and hard to stop. Despite various legal reforms that 
have occurred over time, for example, to the burden of proof,210 such cases still 
involve technical issues which make them complicated to pursue.211 The 
difficulty of ensuring prosecution of sufficient offenders to create deterrence also 
contributes to make such cases unattractive to the public enforcement agen-
cies.212 Thus, the government’s stated aim was to create a system which would 
 
208 See Ruddock, ‘Fair Use and Copyright in Australia’, above n 72, 6, noting that there was little 
stakeholder support for a fair use exception. 
209 Although it is well beyond the scope of this article, one cannot help but wonder whether the 
particular nature of the copyright policy environment in Australia has a great deal to do with the 
adoption of bureaucratic rules. In short, most participants in the copyright reform process are 
highly bureaucratic organisations. The lead participants are the collecting societies and the Aus-
tralian Record Industry Association on the ‘owner’ side, and the universities and libraries on the 
‘user’ side. Missing are creators and even the big owners (although, as Streeter has pointed out, 
they too are very bureaucratic: Streeter, above n 10, 573), as are the technology and consumer 
electronics companies (of the electronics companies, it was really only Apple Incorporated 
which participated at early stages). Google Incorporated joined issue late in the piece, when the 
Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) had already been drafted and the policy decisions had 
been made. It is battle by proxy to some extent, and the proxies are bureaucratic institutions. It 
may also be worth noting that the ‘in-Department’ reform process favoured such participants, by 
giving most advantage to those accustomed to the lobbying process. 
210 See, eg, the presumptions as to subsistence and ownership (Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132A, 
132B) introduced for the first time in relation to the copyright criminal offences in 2003 by the 
Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) Act 2003 (Cth) sch 4. 
211 For a discussion of why copyright enforcement is difficult and not a high priority: see Submis-
sion to House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Enforcement of Copyright in Australia, June 1999, 
Submission No 35 (Australian Federal Police). For complaints regarding the inadequate level of 
enforcement in this area: see Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parlia-
ment of Australia, Cracking Down on Copycats: Enforcement of Copyright in Australia (2000) 
82–8 (‘Copycats Report’). 
212 Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Copycats Report, above n 211, 42–3, 
discussing the low penalties imposed. Where penalties are low, general economic theories of 
criminal law suggest that the risk of detection and punishment must be high for deterrence to be 
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allow ‘more cost-effective administration of the existing enforcement provisions’ 
by providing police and prosecutors with ‘a wider range of penalty options to 
pursue against suspected offenders, depending on the seriousness of the con-
duct.’213 Whether or not one agrees with the policy of strengthening and increas-
ing criminal enforcement of copyright,214 for present purposes the point is that 
the way the government chose to do so resulted in the significant consolidation 
of enforcement power and discretion in the hands of the executive branch and 
police: a shift from the previous position where the judiciary played a more 
important role. Before turning to the details of the changes made, and how they 
fit into the overall thesis presented here, I should note that, in part because they 
were introduced late and without prior consultation, there have been many 
misunderstandings about the nature of the changes to criminal copyright provi-
sions in Australia. My purpose here is not to examine every substantive issue 
raised by the criminal provisions, but to focus on those aspects of the changes to 
the law that might be called ‘regulatory’ in nature. 
Two key changes were made in late 2006. First, the existing offences, most of 
which in the past had been indictable offences for intentional or reckless conduct 
carrying a maximum penalty of five years’ jail, were replaced with a tiered 
regime. Copyright offences now come in three flavours, depending on the fault 
— that is, the state of mind215 — of the defendant:216 
1 An indictable offence carrying a maximum penalty of five years’ impris-
onment and/or $60 500 to $93 500 (550 to 850 penalty units),217 which ap-
plies where the defendant intends their acts, and is reckless as to whether 
they are dealing with an infringing copy;218 
 
effective: see Gary Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1986) 76 Journal 
of Political Economy 169. However, it is very difficult to make the risk high where infringing 
acts are common or widespread. Deterrence is a factor in making the decision to prosecute: see 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth: 
Guidelines for the Making of Decisions in the Prosecution Process (2nd ed, 1990) 9 (‘Prosecu-
tion Policy of the Commonwealth’). It follows that where deterrence is difficult to achieve, 
prosecution will be a less attractive option for law enforcement agencies. 
213 Attorney General’s-Department as quoted in Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, SSCLCA Final Report, above n 78, 18. 
214 There is significant literature questioning whether, and in what circumstances, criminal 
enforcement of copyright is appropriate: see, eg, Geraldine Szott Moohr, ‘The Crime of Copy-
right Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory’ (2003) 83 Bos-
ton University Law Review 731. 
215 Criminal Code ss 3.1, 5.1 refer to the ‘mental element’ or mens rea as a ‘fault element’. 
216 The Exposure Draft: Copyright Amendment (Technological Protection Measures) Bill 2006 
(Cth) applied these three tiers almost across the board, with the exception of offences under 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AC (infringements on a commercial scale), 132AM (advertising 
supply of infringing copies), 132APC–132APE (the technological protection measure offences), 
132ASA–132ASJ (the encoded broadcast offences). The SSCLCA Final Report and media 
attention (see above n 105) led to the removal of several strict liability offences affecting 
non-commercial acts: see Further Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright 
Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) [1]–[26]. For a list: see Attorney-General’s Department, Australia, 
‘New Australian Copyright Laws: Criminal Offence Provisions’ (Fact Sheet, 2007). 
217 Corporations may be fined up to five times that amount: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4B(3). 
218 Criminal Code s 5.6 specifies the default fault element for various physical elements. Reckless-
ness is defined: at s 5.4. 
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2 A summary offence carrying a maximum penalty of two years’ imprison-
ment and/or $13 200 (120 penalty units) for natural persons, which applies 
where the defendant intends their conduct and is negligent as to the fact 
that they are dealing with an infringing copy;219 and 
3 A strict liability offence which carries a maximum penalty of $6600 (60 
penalty units), which does not require proof of fault, although there is a de-
fence of mistake of fact.220 
The second innovation is the introduction of infringement notices for strict 
liability offences.221 Federal or state police may now, as an alternative to 
prosecution,222 issue on-the-spot fines of $1320,223 and require the immediate 
forfeit of infringing copies in a person’s possession and any device designed to 
make infringing copies,224 where they have ‘reasonable grounds to believe that a 
person has committed an offence of strict liability’.225 A person issued with an 
infringement notice has two options: pay the fine (and forfeit), or risk prosecu-
tion and criminal conviction.226 
The key to understanding the regulatory potential of these provisions lies in 
appreciating their breadth. Historically, there is no quantitative threshold for 
criminal liability for copyright infringement: almost all offences under the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) apply to the making of, or dealing with, a single 
infringing article,227 provided it is made for the purposes of trade or commercial 
 
219 Note that this means negligent as to the underlying facts which make the copy infringing, not 
negligence as to the legal status of their act. This makes it very difficult to understand how these 
mental elements will apply. Once you know, for example, that you are dealing with computer 
software (which is all within the period of the copyright term) — what takes you from ‘negli-
gence’ as to your authorisation to deal with the copy, to ‘recklessness’? Detailed examination is 
beyond the scope of this article; suffice it to say it is uncertain. 
220 The defence of mistake of fact applies where a person acts under a ‘mistaken but reasonable 
belief’ as to the circumstances: Criminal Code ss 6.1, 9.2. 
221 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 133B; Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) pt 6A. 
222 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 133B(1); Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) reg 23V. 
223 Twelve penalty units, or 20 per cent of the maximum for the strict liability offences: Copyright 
Regulations 1969 (Cth) reg 23R. Commonwealth policy provides that the penalty in an in-
fringement notice should be one-fifth of the maximum penalty for the offence, and should not 
exceed 12 penalty units for a natural person: Australian Government, A Guide to Framing Com-
monwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers (2004) 46–7. The level of fines 
chosen is the maximum allowed by Commonwealth policy, which is interesting given the addi-
tional punitive effect of the forfeiture requirement: see below n 224. 
224 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 133B(1)(b); Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) reg 23M. The 
requirement of forfeit may significantly compound the penalty; however, the definition of the 
relevant devices in s 133B of the Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) and reg 23N of the Copy-
right Regulations 1969 (Cth) appears to confine the definition to devices ‘made to be used for 
making an infringing copy of a work’ — a narrow definition that would exclude ordinary elec-
tronics. Note that if the authorised person issuing the notice requires forfeiture, and the recipient 
refuses, then an infringement notice cannot be given: Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) 
reg 23O. 
225 Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) reg 23O(1)(a). See also at reg 23P(1)(a). 
226 Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) reg 23V. Payment of the fine, just like the payment of a 
traffic fine, is not an admission of guilt, nor does it lead to a criminal record. Prosecution does 
not follow inevitably from a refusal to pay the fine. 
227 There has been some confusion about how this operates in practice. In law, liability arises in 
respect of infringing ‘articles’ (see, eg, Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD), which might sug-
gest physical things, such as CDs. This is how the law was understood by the Minister for Jus-
tice and Customs: see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 30 November 2006, 164 
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advantage.228 As a result, behaviour extending all the way from the obviously 
‘pirate’ through to quite commonplace commercial acts falls within the scope of 
the criminal offences. For example, s 132AD of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
creates three offences (one for each tier of knowledge) where a defendant: 
• makes an article (which includes an electronic copy);229 
• to sell it or obtain ‘a commercial advantage or profit’; and 
• the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject matter in which 
copyright subsists. 
Clearly, this provision applies to the obvious: the person who makes counter-
feit copies of Hollywood DVDs en masse and sets out to sell them at the market. 
But the provision is also sufficiently broad to apply to a business whose em-
ployee makes a single unlicensed electronic copy, say of a computer program, 
for use in the course of business (this being use ‘to obtain a commercial advan-
tage’).230 It might also apply where, for example, a business was selling a book 
which unintentionally included too large a proportion of someone else’s copy-
right material or which inadvertently used a copyright-infringing photograph on 
the cover. A further point which contributes to the breadth of the provisions is 
that they create Commonwealth offences, meaning that the provisions of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch (‘Criminal Code’) relating to corporate 
criminal liability apply. Under those provisions, corporate criminal liability can 
arise not only from individual acts of ‘high managerial agents’ (such as executive 
officers or directors) of a company, but also where the company has a ‘corporate 
culture’ which encourages, or fails to discourage, the relevant criminal acts.231 In 
the case of strict liability offences, companies have a defence only if they can 
 
(Christopher Ellison), stating it ‘does not matter how many songs are on there; it is the article for 
which you are fined. It would not be a case of being fined 13 times, for each different song on 
the article.’ However, ‘articles’ in fact includes electronic copies of works (Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) s 132AA), and draft guidelines issued by the Attorney-General’s Department state that 
‘[t]echnically, for each song, there would be a separate breach’: Attorney-General’s Department, 
Australia, Draft Guidelines: Copyright Amendment Regulations 2006: Infringement Notices and 
Forfeiture of Infringing Copies and Devices Scheme (2007). This may, however, not be accurate: 
see Submission to the Attorney-General’s Department on the Draft Guidelines for Infringement 
Notices and Forfeiture of Infringing Copies and Devices Scheme, 10 October 2007, Submission 
No 1992 (Law Council of Australia) <http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/sublist.html?year=2007>. 
228 There are also distribution offences which apply in cases where the distribution is sufficient in 
scale to ‘affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright’: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AI. 
Moreover, there is a further provision for infringements (more generally, not involving distribu-
tion necessarily) which are on a commercial scale and have a ‘substantial prejudicial impact’ on 
the copyright owner: at s 132AC. Offences relating to the recording of live performances have 
not tended to include a requirement that the recording be for commercial purposes, merely that it 
be unauthorised: at pt XIA div 3. 
229 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AA. 
230 Regarding the application of Australian law to this kind of ‘end user piracy’: see Attor-
ney-General’s Department, Australia, Interpretive Note on End User Piracy, Appendix to Letter 
from Mark Vaile (Minister for Trade) to Robert Zoellick (United States Trade Representative), 
17 November 2004 <http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/ Section 
_Index.html>. 
231 Criminal Code s 12.3(2)(c)–(d). For a discussion of these provisions: see Jennifer Hill, 
‘Corporate Criminal Liability in Australia: An Evolving Corporate Governance Technique’ 
[2003] Journal of Business Law 1, 16–20. 
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show ‘due diligence’.232 Would it not be common for a company to have a 
‘culture’ that does not actively discourage copyright infringement? To avoid any 
risk of criminal liability, companies would need to have copyright compliance 
systems in place. 
Now, no doubt this all sounds terribly alarmist. It is not unusual, after all, for 
criminal laws to be drafted more broadly than their application in practice, and it 
might be said that all these provisions, including the strict liability provisions, 
are intended to be applied only to ‘obviously’ criminal acts, such as the market 
sale of counterfeits. As with any overbroad criminal law, overbroad application 
of the law will inevitably be limited by budget constraints,233 and managed 
through police and prosecutorial discretion. The current ministerial direction to 
the Australian Federal Police identifies terrorism, transnational and 
multi-jurisdictional crime, illicit drug trafficking, organised people smuggling, 
serious fraud against the Commonwealth and money-laundering as priority areas 
— not copyright.234 According to the published policy of the Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions, prosecutions should proceed where, in the light 
of the provable facts and the whole of the surrounding circumstances, the public 
interest requires a prosecution to be pursued,235 considering (among a long list) 
the seriousness of the crime, mitigating or aggravating circumstances, character-
istics of the alleged offender, the degree of culpability, the effect on public order 
and morale, the prevalence of the alleged offence, the need for deterrence, both 
personal and general, and whether any prosecution would be ‘unduly harsh and 
oppressive’. There is clearly a vast difference in the seriousness of the offence 
committed by the market counterfeit seller as compared with the careless 
business infringer, so we would expect the business using infringing software to 
fall low on the general priority list. And while the Attorney-General’s Depart-
ment refused to specify any particular targets for the criminal provisions,236 as 
one Minister put it, ‘the bill … introduces reforms aimed at tackling copyright 
piracy online and at our markets and borders.’237 
However, prosecutorial discretion is not a complete answer to the argument 
being put here, because I am not arguing that Australians will suddenly face 
 
232 Criminal Code s 12.5(1)(b). Factors relevant to due diligence include whether the company had 
‘adequate systems for conveying relevant information to relevant persons in the body corporate’: 
at s 12.5(2)(b). 
233 Although note, on the point of budget constraints, that the then Attorney-General later 
announced $12.4 million in additional funding: Philip Ruddock, ‘More Resources to Stop Piracy 
and Counterfeiting’ (Press Release, 8 May 2007). 
234 Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2005–06 (2006) 10, quoting the Ministerial Direction 
dated 31 August 2004 under the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s 37(2). 
235 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 212, 9. 
236 See Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, SSCLCA Final Report, 
above n 78, 18–19. 
237 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 November 2006, 113 (Christopher Ellison, 
Minister for Justice and Customs); see also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 30 
November 2006, 164–5 (Christopher Ellison, Minister for Justice and Customs), explaining that: 
throughout my remarks in support of these amendments I have mentioned that the aim of the 
legislation is to target those pirates who are the ‘genuine pirates’, if I can call them that … 
from my knowledge of the AFP and the people they have been targeting, it would … be those 
people down at the markets who are selling CDs in a very organised fashion. They are the 
ones who are doing all the damage. 
     
2007] Of Copyright Bureaucracies and Incoherence 1007 
     
repeated infringement notices when they engage in innocuous acts. Rather, my 
point is that the provisions confer considerable discretion on the executive 
branch, in the form of enforcement agencies and prosecution agencies, without 
parliamentary oversight.238 By passing the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 
(Cth), Parliament gave the executive branch, including the police, carte blanche 
to determine all future copyright criminal enforcement matters, and an incredibly 
flexible and broad set of tools. Prosecution policy, and the drafting and updating 
of enforcement guidelines, are matters for the executive branch: both can change 
without parliamentary oversight.239 Furthermore, while it might well be that the 
current enforcement priority is targeted at ‘dudes at markets with counterfeits’, it 
is not hard to imagine an alternative strategy, directing enforcement efforts at the 
marginal infringer — the person who is generally compliant with legal obliga-
tions and will take little encouragement to make compliance a greater priority.240 
A targeted blitz or campaign directed at a few members of such a societal group 
could yield significant benefits in terms of increased compliance from the group 
more generally. Consider, for example, the benefits to copyright owners and 
collecting societies alike of greater encouragement to businesses to obtain 
licences for all their photocopying activities,241 or proper software licences.242 
Again, I am not saying that such a shift is in prospect now; rather, I am saying 
that it is not fanciful to imagine a decision to treat copyright more like a regula-
tory regime, with enforcement directed at ordinary businesses in particular, to 
encourage compliance. While the government has decided not to direct enforce-
ment priorities for the present, the law is in place to facilitate such a move, and 
the decision to make such a shift would be a decision purely for the executive 
arm of government. 
Thus, the government and/or prosecutorial agencies (whichever has this dis-
cretion allocated to them, depending on how guidelines are written) could 
choose, if they wished, to treat copyright as a regulatory regime, to be applied to 
business as well as the criminal fringe, compliance with which is to be encour-
aged through the use of infringement notices and the strict liability offences. The 
Attorney-General’s Department itself noted that the application of infringement 
 
238 Cf Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 243 XA, which makes the infringement notice guidelines under 
that Act a disallowable instrument and thus subject to parliamentary scrutiny. 
239 In theory, the actual discretion to determine enforcement policies here could lie with the 
Attorney-General’s Department, which drafts the guidelines, or with the actual enforcement 
agencies — that is, the police. Interestingly, when the government issued a draft version of its 
guidelines on the issue of infringement notices in August 2007, it did very little to structure the 
discretion of the police or prosecutorial authorities: Attorney-General’s Department, Australia, 
Draft Guidelines: Copyright Amendment Regulations 2006, above n 227, 8. 
240 Sag, above n 50, 146–7. 
241 Licensing by commercial entities for such activities is listed by CAL as a potential area for 
growth in licensing revenues in its recent annual reports: see CAL, Annual Report 2005–06 
(2006) 2; Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, In-
quiry into the Provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill (2006), 30 October 2006, Submission 
No 29, 11–12, 20 (CAL). In August 2006, the CAL issued a press release promoting the licence 
and noting that ‘businesses need to be more aware of their copyright obligations following the 
recent changes to the Copyright Act’: CAL, ‘Businesses Urged to Consider Digital Copyright’ 
(Press Release, 15 August 2007). 
242 In fact, academic literature has advocated an almost ‘traffic-fine-like’ approach towards online 
infringement: see Lemley and Reese, above n 10, 1418. 
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notices is common for ‘lower level criminal transgressions of certain regulatory 
offences’.243 An examination of Commonwealth law reveals that infringement 
notices are used in areas where the goal of the law is compliance — for example, 
revenue laws,244 disclosure regimes,245 licensing regimes,246 environmental 
protection rules,247 and other safety rules248 — not the protection of private 
property rights.249 It is interesting that while copyright owner representative 
organisations like the Australian Federation against Copyright Theft (‘AFACT’) 
and Music Industry Piracy Investigations constantly liken copyright infringement 
to theft of physical property, there are no infringement notices for car theft or 
handbag snatching. The thinking behind an infringement notice scheme can 
usually be paraphrased as follows: ‘we think that you are not bad people 
generally, but you do need some obvious incentives to ensure you comply with 
this regulatory scheme.’ Indeed, some copyright owners were explicitly con-
cerned that this might be the attitude of police: that police would use the 
infringement notices even where the circumstances indicated that charging and 
prosecution under a more serious offence would be appropriate.250 Whether the 
new provisions end up treating copyright as a compliance matter or something 
else will depend on how they are used — something we will only know in time. 
It is worth noting, too, that the government did have other choices it could 
have made in order to achieve its goal of a more effective copyright enforcement 
regime: once again, it chose the most regulatory option, which suits bureaucratic 
institutions like collecting societies, and which arrogates to the executive the 
 
243 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, SSCLCA Final Report, 
above n 78, 19 (emphasis added). 
244 See, eg, Tradex Scheme Act 1999 (Cth) s 28; Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ss 243T–243V, 243Y; 
Superannuation (Government Co-Contribution for Low Income Earners) Act 2003 (Cth) ss 16, 
20; Excise Act 1901 (Cth) ss 117, 117B. 
245 See, eg, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317DAC; Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) s 65B; 
Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001 (Cth) s 19; Education Services for Overseas 
Students Act 2000 (Cth) ss 104–6; Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth) s 70A; Water Efficiency Labelling 
and Standards Act 2005 (Cth) pt 7. 
246 See, eg, Fisheries Management Regulations 1992 (Cth) pt 10; Broadcasting Services Act 1992 
(Cth) s 65B; Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 280; Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 30DY–30EE. 
247 See, eg, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Regulations 2000 (Cth) sch 10; Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Regulations 1983 (Cth) pt 14; Airports (Environment Protection) Regulations 
1997 (Cth) pt 8 div 2. 
248 See, eg, Airports Act 1996 (Cth) s 208; Airport (Building Control) Regulations 1996 (Cth) pt 5 
div 2; Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Cth) s 117; Interstate Road Transport Regulations 
1986 (Cth) reg 52(2); Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 (Cth) s 187; 
National Transport Commission (Road Transport Legislation — Heavy Vehicles Registration 
Act) Regulations 2006 (Cth) sch 1 pt 3; Road Transport Reform (Dangerous Goods) Act 1995 
(Cth) pt 5; Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 42YJ. 
249 There are some exceptions that do not fit readily into these categories: see, eg, Spam Act 2003 
(Cth) s 30, which authorises the provision of infringement notices for contravention of, for 
example, ss 16 (sending spam) and 20 (address-harvesting). These notices may be aimed at the 
legitimate business which makes a mistake, rather than the large-scale spammer. This is poten-
tially similar to the kind of enforcement we could see in copyright law. The Defence Force 
Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) also has a series of infringement notice provisions for minor discipli-
nary offences: at ss 23, 27, 29, 32(1), 35, 60. The Workplace Relations Regulations 2006 (Cth) 
have a miscellaneous set of provisions with infringement notices: see pts 19, 19B. None of these 
areas concerns the protection of private property rights. 
250 See, eg, Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Inquiry 
into Provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill (2006), 30 October 2006, Submission No 38, 3 
(Australian Recording Industry Association). 
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maximum degree of power and discretion. If the aim is to increase copyright 
enforcement, the obvious step would be to make criminal copyright infringement 
a resources priority, and increase the budget dedicated to such activities,251 or 
take steps to overcome other procedural difficulties that make enforcement 
unattractive to police.252 Alternatively, assuming that it was necessary to make a 
broader set of tools available for enforcement against counterfeit manufacturers 
and sellers, there were various ways to limit the laws so as to make them less 
overbroad and more targeted at the problem of mass counterfeiting as presented 
to Parliament by, for example, imposing quantitative thresholds, limiting the 
application of the provisions to true counterfeits only, or even applying the 
infringement notice scheme only to cases where copyright material is being sold 
(rather than used for commercial advantage).253 Another alternative would have 
been to add criminal offences specifically targeted at the kinds of behaviour 
which appear to be of most concern to copyright owners. AFACT, for example, 
repeatedly cite a concern about camcording of films in cinemas: the government 
could have introduced a provision to make this act an offence (something even 
this enforcement-oriented piece of legislation notably failed to do).254 Or the 
government could have taken quite a different approach and sought to facilitate 
private criminal enforcement. The right to bring proceedings for private en-
forcement of criminal law is a longstanding common law right.255 Private parties 
already have a significant role in the investigation of IP infringement,256 and 
private prosecution of IP provisions is possible in Australian law.257 Experience 
shows that in other countries, too, it has been a useful tool.258 There are, how-
 
251 This was done, but later: see Ruddock, ‘More Resources to Stop Piracy and Counterfeiting’, 
above n 233. 
252 For example, state police have the power to enforce criminal copyright provisions, but because 
copyright is a Commonwealth law, a different set of procedures applies than for prosecutions 
under state law; this suggests that measures to overcome these basic procedural problems might 
be a useful practical step. 
253 See also Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Inquiry 
into Provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006, Undated, Submission No 54A, 2–3 
(Kimberlee Weatherall). 
254 See Supplementary Submission to SSLCA, Inquiry into Provisions of the Copyright Amendment 
Bill 2006, 9 November 2006, Submission No 57B, 1 (Australian Federation Against Copyright 
Theft) noting that ‘over 90% of the 13 million pirate movies sold or the 11 million downloaded 
in Australia in 2005 started life with a person copying the film in a cinema with an ordinary 
camcorder’. 
255 Where the alleged criminal breach affects the plaintiff’s personal rights or would inflict special 
damage on them: Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435. 
256 Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Copycats Report, above n 211, 
[3.22]–[3.23]; see also Tim Prenzler and Michael King, ‘The Role of Private Investigators and 
Commercial Agents in Law Enforcement’ (2002) 234 Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal 
Justice 1, 3. 
257 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 13; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 10(2). The 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions has the power to take over a private prosecu-
tion: Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 9(5). According to the Prosecution Policy 
of the Commonwealth, the private prosecutor should be permitted to retain the prosecution 
unless there is insufficient evidence, there are grounds to suspect that ‘the decision to prosecute 
was actuated by improper personal or other motives’, or to proceed would be ‘contrary to the 
public interest’: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Prosecution Policy of the 
Commonwealth, above n 212, 17. 
258 See, eg, Law Commission, England and Wales, Consents to Prosecution: A Consultation Paper, 
Law Com No 149 (1997) (recommending private prosecutions in IP be brought to an end); 
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ever, barriers to the effective use of private prosecution, not least the confusing 
current system which involves different procedures in different jurisdictions 
around Australia. Admittedly, it does not lie within the power of the Common-
wealth Attorney-General to change the rules on private prosecutions across 
Australia, but there would be nothing to prevent the Attorney-General’s Depart-
ment from seeking to facilitate changes which encouraged such methods of 
enforcement against serious ‘pirates’. Instead, the approach of having tiers of 
offences, and in particular, the creation of strict liability offences arguably makes 
moves towards private prosecution less likely. With so many enforcement 
provisions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), and so many of them strict liability 
provisions, it seems unlikely that the government would want to place such a 
powerful tool in the hands of private parties.259 I am not seeking here to advocate 
private prosecutions, which carry a series of well-known risks.260 The point is 
that the government had choices: to provide the budget necessary to increase 
enforcement via public bodies; to narrow the strict liability offences and in-
fringement notice regime to the identified criminal acts, and thus require 
recourse to Parliament before any significant departure from that situation in 
prosecution policy were proposed; or to encourage more private enforcement. 
Instead, the government chose to broaden the tools of public enforcement, confer 
on itself significant discretion, and create the legal environment for treating 
copyright in a similar manner to compliance-oriented regulatory regimes. 
C  The TPM Provisions 
My final example, and the third high profile area where the Copyright Amend-
ment Act 2006 (Cth) made changes to copyright, is in relation to 
anti-circumvention law. Anti-circumvention laws give legal protection to 
technical measures used by copyright owners to control use of their copyright 
content, particularly in a digital context. They do so by making it illegal to 
‘crack’ (or in legal terms, ‘circumvent’) those technical measures, and/or to sell 
devices, programs, or provide services for such circumvention. In other words 
 
Gwilym Harbottle, ‘Private Prosecutions in Copyright Cases: Should They Be Stopped?’ [1998] 
European Intellectual Property Review 317 (defending the option); Law Commission, England 
and Wales, Consents to Prosecution: A Final Report, Law Com No 255 (1998) (retreating from 
recommendation to abolish, and supporting their continuation on the basis of feedback received). 
See also Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Copycats Report, 
above n 211, [4.59]–[4.60]. 
259 There is a significant body of commentary expressing the view that private prosecutions are of 
little or no value in a context where there exists a professional, independent prosecuting service 
— namely, the Director of Public Prosecutions: see Jones v Whalley [2007] 1 AC 63, 71 (Lord 
Bingham); Law Commission, New Zealand, Criminal Prosecution, Report No 66 (2000) [258]. 
260 For example, cutting across public prosecution policies: concerns about the ‘unduly vengeful or 
vexatious’ private prosecutor (Law Commission, New Zealand, above n 259); the oppressiveness 
of using criminal proceedings when civil proceedings would be just as appropriate (Thames & 
Hudson Ltd v Design & Artists Copyright Society Ltd [1995] FSR 153; Law Commission, Eng-
land and Wales, Consents to Prosecution: A Consultation Paper, above n 258, [6.48]); the poten-
tial for use of criminal proceedings by a private prosecutor to bolster their negotiating position in 
a civil dispute (Law Commission, England and Wales, Consents to Prosecution: A Final Report, 
above n 258, 68); and the risks of excessive litigation by powerful companies: Andrew 
Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 225, 235. Cf 
Harbottle, above n 258, 318–20. 
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we are talking about technologies such as Apple’s FairPlay technology, which 
limits the use and copying of music purchased from iTunes, and the Content 
Scrambling System used to prevent copying of movies released on DVD. 
Anti-circumvention law has been a highly controversial area of copyright reform, 
in part because such technical measures, while being used to protect copyright, 
are also used for ‘non-copyright’ purposes: preventing copying for criticism or 
review, for example, or even for such unpopular measures as ‘region-coding’ 
(geographical segmentation of markets) or ‘platform lock-in’ (iTunes-purchased 
songs, for example, cannot be played on other digital music players).261 It was 
also a particularly controversial area in the process of implementation: the initial 
release of draft legislation led to a flurry of submissions and significant changes 
to the legislation prior to the Bill being introduced into Parliament.262 This is not 
the place to explore the more general issues surrounding the implementation, 
which will no doubt be explored in other work. 
In terms of options, the AUSFTA left the Australian government only limited 
choice in how to enact Australia’s new anti-circumvention laws.263 There are 
several parts of the new anti-circumvention laws which fit the general pattern 
described in this Part, such as the strictly limited and detailed list of exceptions, 
but where this merely reflects the terms of the AUSFTA, rather than a deliberate 
legislative choice, it is of less interest. For present purposes, however, one aspect 
of the implementation is worthy of note. Under art 17.4.7(e)(viii) of the 
AUSFTA, Australia is entitled to introduce new exceptions to the ban on circum-
venting access control technical measures ‘when an actual or likely adverse 
impact on … non-infringing uses is credibly demonstrated in a legislative or 
administrative review or proceeding’. The provision is modelled on a triennial 
process for creating new exceptions to the equivalent ban under US law,264 in 
which the US Office of the Register of Copyrights, an administrative agency 
which is part of the Library of Congress,265 reviews whether users are being 
unduly disadvantaged every three years. In the US, a public announcement is 
made of the review, and a process of submissions, reply submissions, and public 
hearings follows, with the end result being a ‘rule-making’ by the Librarian of 
Congress on advice from the Register of Copyrights. While the relevant provi-
sion of the AUSFTA summarised this US system for managing copyright 
 
261 See also Clapperton and Corones, above n 140. 
262 The submissions are appended to the Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006, Un-
dated, Submission No 69B (Attorney-General’s Department). The changes made, and their 
significance, are discussed in Dale Clapperton, ‘The Elusive “Link” to Infringement in the 
Copyright Amendment Bill 2006: Now You See It, Now You Don’t’ (2007) 19 Australian Intel-
lectual Property Law Bulletin 141–4; Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘Response to Dale Clapperton’s 
Article’ (2007) 19 Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 145. 
263 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.7 (entered into force 1 January 2005). 
See generally Rimmer, above n 37; Emma Caine and Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘Australia–US Free 
Trade Agreement: Circumventing the Rationale for Anti-Circumvention?’ (2005) 7 Internet Law 
Bulletin 121; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
TPM Inquiry Report, above n 73. 
264 17 USC §1201(a)(1)(C) (2000 & Supp V, 2006); House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, TPM Inquiry Report, above n 73, 138–9. 
265 The role of the Copyright Office is described: see above n 141. 
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exceptions, the AUSFTA did not include all the machinery of that process in its 
text.266 
This left the government some choice as to how the system should be managed 
and by whom. A number of possibilities spring to mind: proceedings could have 
been carried out by the CLRC (but of course, it no longer exists),267 the Copy-
right Tribunal,268 a parliamentary committee (such as the House of Representa-
tives Committee which conducted the TPM Inquiry in 2005), or the Attor-
ney-General’s Department.269 There was also a question of how often reviews 
should occur: whether there should be, in effect, a ‘once-every-four-years 
extravaganza’, or, on the other hand, whether there should be opportunity to 
apply at any point for an exception (ad hoc reviews). The recommendation of the 
House of Representatives Committee, accepted by the government, was that the 
Attorney-General’s Department should conduct reviews, and that both ad hoc 
and periodic reviews should be available, and that any resulting exceptions 
should be promulgated by way of the Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth).270 This 
is now reflected in s 249 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The presence of an 
ability to conduct ad hoc reviews creates an interesting dynamic, the potential of 
which I will return to in a moment. However, it is worth further noting that the 
legislation confers considerable discretion on how the process will occur within 
the executive. Section 249 does not require a public review,271 publication of any 
submission made,272 or any opportunity for reply submissions to be made.273 The 
only apparent form of parliamentary scrutiny that would apply would be the 
tabling of any regulations made.274 This gives the Minister the power to set the 
process, and vary it, and subject it to the degree of transparency which they think 
fit — even reject the conclusions of any independent body which conducts any 
 
266 This forms an interesting contrast with the ISP safe harbours, where even the machinery was 
specified in a side letter: see above nn 144–7 and accompanying text. 
267 See above n 19. 
268 Many stakeholders rejected the Copyright Tribunal as being an unsuitable body for various 
reasons: see House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
TPM Inquiry Report, above n 73, 142. 
269 Ibid 141. 
270 Ibid 143–7; see also Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249; Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) reg 20Z, 
sch 10A. 
271 There is no general legal requirement that persons affected by the making of subordinate rules 
should be heard by the rule-maker: G J Craven, ‘Legislative Action by Subordinate Authorities 
and the Requirement of a Fair Hearing’ (1988) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 569. 
272 As noted above, submissions from Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Fair Use Review’, 
above n 70, were not initially published; nor were submissions on the Exposure Draft: Copyright 
Amendment (Technological Protection Measures) Bill 2006 (Cth) until requested by the Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. 
273 There was no process of reply submissions in the TPM Inquiry by the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, although there was a process of reply 
in another, mini-review run by the Attorney-General’s Department more recently. Compare the 
process applied in the US: see above n 264 and accompanying text. 
274 Under Australian law, regulations must be notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 
and then tabled before each House of Parliament within 15 days of having been made. Within 15 
sitting days of tabling, a motion of disallowance may be made, in which case the regulations will 
be debated. However, they need not be passed or formally approved by the Parliament. Bottom-
ley, above n 158, 11 has also noted, citing Page, above n 123, 8–9, that the level of ministerial 
involvement in the making of regulations is less than that would be expected during the drafting 
of legislation. It is unclear whether the same would be true in this context. 
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review.275 Thus, again, as with the criminal enforcement provisions, maximum 
discretion and flexibility have been reserved to the executive branch.276 It should 
be clear from the above that the final shape of the system adopted was a matter 
of government choice: it looks very little like the US system which was the 
model for the provision of the AUSFTA. 
The power to create new exceptions ad hoc is, in my view, a particularly 
interesting power, which could be used to affect significantly the nature of 
relations between copyright owners and copyright users. Technological protec-
tions for digital copyright works operate in a dynamic market. To over-generalise 
a complicated process and vast literature, large corporate copyright owners in 
particular have often exhibited a desire to control all or close to all uses of their 
copyright material, and to enforce those controls through technology, limited 
only by the extent of user resistance to the technology (make it too hard to use 
material and people will not pay). Users, both institutional and individual, tend 
to want more freedom to use and communicate copyright material. Also relevant 
are the consumer electronics manufacturers, who may be caught between a rock 
and a hard place: wanting to produce electronics that will grant users more 
freedom, but needing the consent of copyright owners before they can manufac-
ture the devices that will read copy-controlled copyright works. Interactions 
between all of these players will, in the end, determine the controls placed on 
copyright material and their effectiveness; controls which may be different 
depending on the particular market in question. Anti-circumvention laws tend to 
strengthen the hand of the copyright owners. For example, with such laws in 
place, if copyright owners only sell their works digitally in encrypted form, then 
the maker of any technology to render or allow consumers to use the files must 
have the permission of the copyright owner to sell their technology.277 
From a public policy perspective, the best possible result is if technology does 
not block desirable uses, if copyright owners provide the access that people need, 
while maintaining the level of profitability that will ensure continued creation, 
and if mutually beneficial deals can be reached between all three relevant 
groups. As I have argued elsewhere,278 it is possible that policymakers can 
facilitate this outcome by showing themselves willing to create new exemptions. 
If policymakers show themselves willing to provide exemptions in the face of 
unwarranted blockages imposed by copyright owners on socially valuable uses, 
particularly uses by institutional users more capable of using the procedure for 
 
275 Cf House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, TPM 
Inquiry Report, above n 73, 143, which proposed that the ‘public nature of any future inquiries 
be set out in the Copyright Act 1968’, and that the process be made ‘as transparent as possible 
with all material considered by the review available publicly.’ Transparency has not been a 
feature of the recent reviews by the Attorney-General’s Department. 
276 Amusingly, the Exposure Draft: Copyright Amendment (Technological Protection Measures) 
Bill 2006 (Cth) reserved an even broader discretion to the government — it allowed the Minister 
to respond to any submission seeking an exception any time within four years of receiving it: at 
s 116AK(9)–(13). 
277 There is a vast literature on how digital rights management works, and how it interacts with 
anti-circumvention law, but a general level introduction may be found in House of Representa-
tives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, TPM Inquiry Report, above n 73. 
278 Submission to House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Parliament of Australia, 21 October 2005, Submission No 38 (Kimberlee Weatherall). 
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creating ad hoc exceptions, copyright owners will have a greater incentive to be 
receptive to user concerns, or make deals, rather than simply stonewall requests 
for access. A similar system is in place in Europe to encourage ‘fair use by 
design’ under the Information Society Directive.279 Under that directive, member 
countries must ‘take appropriate measures to ensure that rightholders make 
available to the beneficiary of an exception or limitation provided for in national 
law’, in the absence of ‘voluntary measures taken by rightholders’.280 The 
purpose of the European system is to encourage copyright owners to ‘create 
space’ for users, but failing that, owners may be compelled to make 
non-encrypted versions of works available to users.281 This approach may be 
particularly important for a country like Australia, which, given its small 
economy, cannot hope to influence the general development of technology, but 
may have some influence in relation to particular concerns expressed by 
significant stakeholders. 
Of course, we ought not to assume that the government will use this power to 
make exceptions ad hoc so as to affect the relations between copyright owners 
and users. The power might well end up being a dead letter. However, the 
potential is clearly there for the Attorney-General’s Department to influence the 
practices of copyright owners in their dealings with users. 
V  CONCLUSIONS 
In earlier Parts of this article, I outlined the kind of process Australia went 
through in reaching its new copyright law: one where copyright policy went 
‘in-Department’, where all the substantive choices, other than those dictated by 
treaty, were made within the bounds of the bureaucracy. The laws that resulted 
from this process arguably bear the hallmarks of their heritage. My three 
examples serve to illustrate two important points. First, that system matters: 
reforms look different when observed through the lens of their effect on the 
bureaucratic system which relates to copyright law, and the constitution and 
relations between institutions that impact copyright and copyright stakeholders. 
Secondly, that throughout the recent reforms the Australian government showed 
a marked tendency to make choices displaying two features: 
1 the adoption of legislative features and tools more often seen in regulatory 
regimes, including, in particular, highly specified rules or guidelines, either 
in legislation or encouraged by it, which can be applied in effect automati-
cally; and 
2 the allocation of decision-making power to expert officials, in the form of 
new or extended roles for various parts of the executive. 
 
279 European Parliament and Council, Directive on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001/29/EC (2001). 
280 Ibid art 6.4. 
281 For a detailed discussion of the merits of the fair use by design approach: see Burrell and 
Coleman, above n 131, 70–5. For a discussion of the issues of using copyright law to influence 
copying technologies: see Andrew T Kenyon and Robin Wright, ‘Television as Something Spe-
cial? Content Control Technologies and Free-to-Air TV’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law 
Review 338. 
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While I have chosen three high profile areas of copyright reform in which to 
explore these decisions, I could have picked others: recent reforms also ex-
panded the jurisdiction of the Australian Copyright Tribunal,282 in particular over 
collective licences;283 granted various roles to other bodies, including the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’)284 and the 
Australian Communications and Media Authority (‘ACMA’),285 to make 
decisions which will impact on the scope and nature of copyright owners’ rights; 
and, of course, introduced the ISP safe harbour regime described briefly 
above.286 All of these reforms obviously increased the role of various parts of the 
executive. While I have not discussed them in any detail, they too, contribute to 
the general flavour of the recent reforms. 
At the risk of some repetition, I should remind the reader that I am not seeking 
to describe a conspiracy of self-aggrandisement, nor, necessarily, a new phe-
nomenon: copyright law has long been accompanied by a considerable bureauc-
racy. It may be that we could look back at other periods of copyright reform and 
draw similar conclusions about the choices law-makers made. Alternatively, 
looking back at past reform periods we might find very different approaches 
being adopted. Without doing a detailed study, it would be foolish to draw 
conclusions. I have sought to point out the nature of recent choices: a subject of 
all too little commentary. This discussion raises a number of interesting ques-
tions. 
From a purely practical perspective, both the history and the analysis presented 
here suggest that more thought needs to be given to how the copyright system 
ought to be managed on an ongoing basis. There is no evidence that any serious 
 
282 Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) schs 10–11. 
283 The new powers include the power to: declare or revoke the declaration of a collecting society 
(Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 135P, 135Q, 135ZZB, 135ZZC, 135ZZT, 135ZZU); make determi-
nations regarding all licences administered by collecting societies (at s 136); entertain applica-
tions made by collecting societies, or members of those societies, for review of the arrangements 
for allocating and distributing remuneration (at ss 135SA, 135ZZEA, 135ZZWA, 183F); and 
more generally, make determinations on ‘any question that is necessary or convenient to help an 
administering body of an educational or other institution or the collecting society to comply in 
the future with the requirements of the statutory licences’: at ss 135JAA, 135JZWAA. 
284 The ACCC was given a role in proceedings before the Copyright Tribunal, which may have 
regard to any relevant guidelines issued by the ACCC when making a determination (Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth) s 157A), and admit the ACCC as a party to Tribunal proceedings (Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) s 157B): see ACCC, Copyright Licensing and Collecting Societies: A Guide for 
Copyright Licensees: Draft for Comment (2006) 5, 33. 
285 The Broadcasting Legislation Amendment (Digital Television) Act 2006 (Cth) gave the ACMA 
‘more general powers … to determine standards’ in relation to communication technologies: 
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Broadcasting Legislation Amendment (Digital Television) 
Bill 2006 (Cth) 81 (discussing sch 2A of the Bill). The ACMA now has the power to set techni-
cal standards relating to the transmission of, and receivers for, digital television broadcasting and 
datacasting services: Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) ss 130A–130B. In the US, similar 
powers granted to the Federal Communications Commission were used in order to require tele-
vision reception equipment to recognise the ‘Broadcast Flag’ — that is, copyright protecting 
technology, although this was later overturned: see generally David Brennan, ‘Flag Waving in 
the Digital Jungle’ in Andrew T Kenyon (ed), TV Futures: Digital Television Policy in Australia 
(2007) 214; Kenyon and Wright, above n 281. The Broadcasting Legislation Amendment (Digi-
tal Television) Act 2006 (Cth) sch 2A also added a new pt 9B to Broadcasting Services Act 1992 
(Cth), giving ACMA the power to register, and hence make enforceable, industry codes, which 
could deal with such matters as Electronic Program Guides (‘EPGs’). 
286 See above nn 144–7 and accompanying text. 
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thought has been given by the government to how we can ensure that the various 
powers described here can be exercised in a coherent or consistent way. As 
charted in this article, powers and discretions have been allocated to all different 
kinds of executive bodies: the Attorney-General’s Department (copyright and 
international law divisions) and the Attorney-General, DFAT (as these matters 
relate to trade agreements), the Copyright Tribunal, the federal and state police 
and prosecutorial authorities, the ACCC, and the ACMA. All have a role or 
potential role in matters relevant to determining the scope and exercise of 
copyright rights. Relations between these different organisations do not appear to 
be formalised in any way. Unlike many other areas where there is an increasing 
trend towards regulation, in copyright there is no industry regulator to formulate 
overall policies and priorities; on the contrary, there are many, who occasionally 
have reason to look at copyright (no doubt, askance).287 This raises an interesting 
question: do we need either some concentration of these powers and discretion, 
as Ricketson has previously argued, for the sake of coherence and efficiency,288 
or alternatively, a supervisory body of some kind, as the Labor Senators consid-
ering the AUSFTA proposed at one point?289 Or alternatively, does the involve-
ment of all of these different regulators, with their different perspectives and 
priorities, represent a strength, not a weakness, of the Australian system? 
Without a much more detailed discussion, I am not able to answer those ques-
tions; I merely point out at this stage that it is a debate we need to have. 
Beyond these very practical questions, the material discussed in this article 
also raises some interesting broader issues. What is the appropriate level of 
delegation to the executive of ongoing copyright policymaking? How much 
parliamentary oversight should there be? As scholars in copyright, how can we 
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of Australia’s ‘copyright bureaucracy’? 
And are these recent trends merely reflective of the nature of IP as a form of 
‘bureaucratic property’, or part of a general trend towards greater regulation? In 
future work I hope to address some of these questions. Suffice it to say, there is 
much thought to be given to the institutions of intellectual property generally, 
and copyright in particular. 
 
287 Cf corporate law, where the Australian Securities and Investments Commission maintains 
primary responsibility, although there are others involved, such as the Australian Stock Ex-
change: Bottomley, above n 158, 1–4. 
288 Ricketson, above n 8. 
289 SSCFTA, SSCFTA Report, above n 54, 230. The recommendation was for ‘a Select Committee 
on Intellectual Property to comprehensively investigate and make recommendations for an 
appropriate IP regime for Australia in light of the significant changes required to Australian IP 
law by the AUSFTA.’ It was aimed at dealing with the AUSFTA changes, so is perhaps less 
relevant now. However, a standing committee of the type proposed, also recommended by Rick-
etson, could exercise consistent oversight by Senators who would not have to educate them-
selves each time about copyright: see above n 8; cf above n 138 and accompanying text. The 
government’s response to this was that no such committee was necessary, given that Australia’s 
IP legislation is ‘extensively governed’ by commitments in multilateral and bilateral treaties: 
Australian Government, Government Response to the Final Report of the Senate Select Commit-
tee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the United States of America, 4 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate_freetrade/gov_response/gov_response.pdf>. 
